Milesian élite responses to Persia: The Ionian Revolt in context

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ABSTRACT: This article applies concepts of agency, *habitus* and postcolonialism to a close textual criticism of Herodotus' narrative in order to construct a nuanced understanding of how the Milesian élite negotiated their relationship with Persia and the resultant social context that resulted in the fateful decision to attack the Persian seat of Sardis and begin the Ionian Revolt. Herodotus portrays the earlier Milesian attempt to settle at Myrkinus as a pivotal event and, like the attack on Sardis itself, it can be can be understood to have been prompted by a Milesian *habitus* of gaining *arête* (honour) through colonisation and war, a *habitus* that was already long-established under the preceding rule by Lydia. This article views *habitus* as a generative, rather than a restrictive, force in the historical interpretive process - which is closer to Bourdieu's original concept and provides a fresh perspective on the meeting of the Milesian élite and Persian imperial spheres. Taking a generative view, the Milesian leader Histiaios can be seen to have leveraged Persian aid to gain *arête* for himself by founding a city, whereas his successor, Aristagoras, channelled Persian military power into an opportunistic raid on Naxos. When that failed, and perhaps inspired by Polykrates of Samos, he attacked Sardis in an attempt to regain his *arête*. The 'revolt' he initiated, which we see as a functional behaviour within a specific social context, then itself becomes a literary construct that serves as a vehicle for Colonialist and Orientalist constructs of past events (including by Herodotus himself) which is it hard to disentangle from the originating context of the events themselves.



Figure One: Sites mentioned in the article.

Introduction

The power dynamic between Miletos and Persia has traditionally been viewed from the Milesian experience alone and purely through the prism of ancient Greek historians, especially Herodotus.[1] However, being a relationship between two players, albeit one in which power relations were uneven,[2] it is possible to review their interactions from a postcolonial perspective - questioning how the Persians viewed Miletos and also exploring the balance and flow of power relations between Persia, Miletos and Miletos' own overseas colonies as a third party in the Milesian/Persian relationship.[3] This focus, analysing power relations between two intersecting cultures is a classic postcolonial approach, but we must also recognise that colonial and postcolonial approaches turn on the nexus of individual human agency. Agency permeates postcolonial studies of the subaltern and the colonial in the works of postcolonial thinkers, such as Homi Bhabha, as well as ancient historians, such as Gabriel Zuchtriegel, who seek to balance *polis*-centric and élitist views within Greek history by examination of the experiences of non-élite populations.[4]

An agency-based postcolonial approach therefore allows us to consider the experiences of individual Milesians, who not only embodied their Greek and Persian identities but also other long-established Anatolian cultural traits. Historical analysis inevitably leads us back to Herodotus and the two individuals who he attributes with starting the Ionian Revolt: Histaiaos and Aristagoras.[5] In standard colonial readings of the relevant sources and events, it is usual to think of Persian rule as placing limitations on members of the Milesian élite, like Histaiaos and Aristagoras, and their scope for individual action – that is to say it imposed a new, restrictive *habitus* that constrained the scope of their actions. In the first section of this article we will, therefore, examine the origins and character of Milesian élite culture, and explanations for the Ionian Revolt that have been offered as arising from that élite context, many of which are based on colonialist or Orientalist assumptions.

In the second part of this article, we examine Pierre Bourdieu's originating conception of *habitus*, which was a decidedly more complex field of cognitive experience than the purely limiting socially-imposed stricture on individual action that it is commonly understood to be. Any form of retrospective historical re-assessment is necessarily speculative but the historiography of study of the ancient Greeks' decision making has often been dominated by the concept of the rational/irrational binary.[6] The idea that the Milesians were the standard-bearers for Western natural philosophy and rational thought has dominated the study of ancient Ionia even though it is clearly at odds with some of their most important cultural practices, such as the use of oracles.[7] However, a more contemporary method is to take a cognitive approach which 'encompasses all activities of the mind and allows them an equal share of attention.'[8] Such a holistic cognitive approach builds on the experience of two of the authors (AG and FR), who are practicing psychotherapists,[9] and encompasses both pre-existing Greek cultural practices as well as the new reality of their position vis-à-vis Persia to give us new insights into

[1] Briant 2017.
[2] Foucault 1971; Tracy 2014.
[3] Greaves 2010; 2019.
[4] Bhabha 1994; Zuchtriegel 2018.
[5] Hdt. 5.30-8; Munson 2007.
[6] Struck 2016.
[7] Greaves 2012.
[8] Struck 2016, 8.
[9] https://www.alangreaves.com/ and https://www.bluespherecare.com/ respectively.

the motivations and behaviours of key historical individuals and how they chose to exercise their agency.

In part three, we then deploy this empowering, or 'generative', reading of Bourdieu's *habitus* concept as a meaningful tool by which to reappraise Milesian/Persian relations and explore how it can enable new understandings of the contexts of Milesian élite behaviour under Persia to emerge.[10] Reading our historical sources through this cognitive frame demonstrates that Persian rule was, in fact, an empowering experience for the Milesian élite – particularly when, as in the case of Histaiaos, they operated within what might be described as the 'trans-colonial' space between the Milesian élite and the Persian Court. The opportunities that Persian rule afforded this already powerful local élite evidently allowed them to pursue personal *arête* (honour) in ways that were consistent with their Greek cultural traditions but using means that were available to them as subjects of the Persian Empire.

We conclude that, rather than being restricted or marginalised by Persian rule or being 'torn between East and West', members of the Milesian élite embraced their trans-colonial status and used it to their advantage by leveraging Persian power to achieve the personal *arête* demanded of them by their Greek identity. Their instigation of the Ionian Revolt represents one of the most important manifestations of this psychocultural agency, but not the only one – the foundation of Myrkinos being another key example that we examine in detail here.

Our application of generative *habitus* as part of a cognitive approach represents an important new interpretative tool for historical analysis and a useful paradigm for understanding both group and individual action in the historic past more broadly. Few previous treatments of this topic have focused on the relationship between the Milesian élite and the Persian empire beyond the events the Ionian Revolt itself, while fewer still have sought to explore these relationships through theoretically grounded approaches.[11] Our original approach of applying generative *habitus* has allowed us to analyse the multi-faceted ways in which these deep relationships were constituted, deployed, and maintained whilst taking into account the inherent problems within a large and differentiated set of evidence. Not only do we view *habitus* as generative, rather than just limiting, it can also be read as an embodied phenomenon of the individual, rather than as an external social pressure. We are thus able to provide new ways in which narrative accounts of the period can be constituted and original understandings of the motivations and actions of individual agents in historical contexts achieved by methods that can be replicated by historians of other regions and periods.

Our findings are significant not just because they offer new insights into how the expansion of Persia into the wider Mediterranean and Middle Eastern worlds impacted on those it encountered but also because the sixth century was a crucial period in the history of Greece, and Ionia in particular. Before and during the Persian period, Miletos was the reputed birthplace of philosophy and science while simultaneously undertaking the settlement and urbanization of much of the Black Sea coast. However, the crucial relationship at the heart of Miletos' prosperity, its interaction with Achaemenid Persia, has usually been cast in exclusively teleological terms, viewed retrospectively through the lens of the Ionian Revolt at the turn of the century. This ignores the previous half-century of Milesian history when revolt was neither inevitable, nor likely, and during which the city prospered on a grand scale. We conclude that Orientalist viewpoints, which were themselves fostered from the end of the

[10] Dalleo 2016.

[11] On the reasoned and principled rejection of the application of archaeological theory by the excavators at Miletos, see Greaves 2010: 32-36.

Persian Wars, have miscast the role of the Persian Empire in Ionia's prosperity and, subsequently, seriously limited our ability to understand the nuanced historical and cultural processes at work and the role of individual agents within it.

PART ONE: The Milesian Élite

Our concept of the Ionian revolt will inevitably frame how we understand the relationship between the Greek *poleis* of Western Anatolia and Persia. This revolt, which near contemporary sources acknowledged to be ill-advised,[12] led not only to the total destruction of Miletos itself but also Athens and many other cities and was to influence the nature of political events across a wide temporal and geographic range up to, and including, the conquests of Alexander the Great. Our only surviving source for this period, Herodotus, offers an extended narrative on it.[13] According to him, the revolt was precipitated by an appeal from a group of aristocratic Naxian exiles to the Milesian tyrant Aristagoras, requesting his assistance to return them to their homeland. This led Aristagoras to seek military support from the Persian Satrap Artaphernes to conquer Naxos and he, in turn, received permission from the Persian King Darius to go ahead with the campaign. The failure of the expedition left Aristagoras out of pocket and in conflict with his Persian sponsors, so he encouraged an uprising within the Ionian fleet and deposed their Persian-imposed tyrants and commanders.[14] At around the same time Histaiaos, Aristagoras' predecessor at Miletos, sent a secret message further encouraging revolt. The revolt soon spread across the entire western Anatolian seaboard as far as Cyprus but after some initial successes the Persians were able to quell the rebel states. Yet this account, which essentially places the blame for instigating the revolt on the personal ambitions of the Milesian aristocrats Histiaios and Aristagoras, is often perceived by scholars as biased, inadequate and misleading[15] and some even question if there was even a 'revolt' at all.[16]

As noted above, Herodotus' account of the Ionian Revolt casts a long shadow over any text-based study of Miletos prior to its destruction in 494 BCE. His narrative of suppression, revolt and destruction at the hands of the all-conquering Persians fits into broader narrative themes within his text that seek to demonstrate the unstoppable power of Persia (at least until it encountered Athens!) and the literary motif of a reversal of fortune for the once-powerful Miletos.[17] It is now widely accepted that Herodotus' narrative is the product of its contemporary late fifth century context[18] and does not convey the true nature of Archaic period Ionian society and politics which can be better achieved through a more nuanced reading of the few extant fragments of ethno-historical sources and the extensive, but complex, archaeological evidence of the region.[19]

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[12] *Hdt*. 5.97. see also 5.28-30. "αὗται δὲ αἱ νέες ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγένοντο Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι." For Herodotus opinion of the Ionians in general see Gillis 1979: 1-37; Munson 2007; Neville 1979: 271-1, argues that the case has been overstated.

[13] *Hdt*. 5.30-6.42.

[14] Evans 1963, 119; Murray 1988, 473-4; Austin 1990, 290 n.4; Osborne 2009, 306.

[15] Grundy 1901, 85; Cary & Gray 1926, 215-6; Burn 1962, 197; Lang 1968, 24; Walter 1993, 257-73; c.f. Chapman 1972; Georges 2000, 27.

[16] Neville 1979.

[17] Harrison 2002; Guth 2017.

[18] See Moles 2002: 34-5, *passim*.

[19] See Mac Sweeney 2013 and Greaves 2010, respectively

Within Herodotus' work the Ionian Revolt has a number of important narrative and signifying purposes. Most importantly it acts as the fulcrum on which his narrative of conflict between Greeks and Persians, East and West, turns decisively towards the Persian invasions of mainland Greece.[20] Furthermore, the narrative of Book Five is interspersed with digressions on Athenian and Spartan history, continuing the discursive themes of Book One and bringing the reader up to speed with developments in the two *poleis* on whom the responsibility for Greek resistance to Persia will ultimately hinge.[21] This causes a number of interpretative problems for the historian aiming to reconstruct the culture and motivations of the Milesian élite in the later sixth century. Firstly, it is difficult to divorce the information provided from its narrative context - the aspects of the revolt that Herodotus chooses to present to his reader are, more often than not, done to fulfil broader thematic points within his work.[22] Secondly, Herodotus' discussion of the relationship between the Ionian *poleis* and Persia prior to the revolt is limited and fragmentary.[23]

We learn that after the defeat of the Lydian Empire, the Persians subsequently sought to reduce the Ionian states by military force, with the notable exception of Miletos whose prior treaty with the Lydians was honoured by Cyrus and which can be read to imply Milesian collaboration with the Persians immediately prior to the fall of Sardis in 546 BCE.[24] Despite this, scholars have nevertheless found it difficult to divorce Miletos' positive relationship with Persia in the later sixth century from the fact of its subsequent revolt. Because the Milesians chose to revolt, the argument goes, their relationship with the Persian Empire in the preceding half-century must have entailed some kind of oppression, severe enough to justify the risk of a full-scale revolt and its potentially negative outcomes; in the words of Simon Hornblower 'we should ask … why the revolt happened as late as it did?'[25] The problem then is that in seeking to understand how Miletos interacted with the Persian Empire, it has proved difficult to disassociate the study of the Milesian élite from a teleological interpretation which takes the known event of the revolt as an inevitable result of their prior relationship. As a result, attempts to explain the revolt, more often than not, assume it to be a culmination of prior Milesian-Persian interactions. In other words, the causes of the Ionian Revolt have become, by proxy, the sum of Miletos' relationship with Persia in the second half of the sixth century BCE. If we are to seek a new way of understanding this relationship more deeply, we must first of all cast a critical eye over previous attempts to understand the Ionian Revolt.

Political Causes of the Ionian Revolt

Various theories have been proposed to explain the Ionian Revolt that can be broadly characterised as being political motivations. A particularly enduring explanation posits an anti-tyrannical attitude, perceived in Herodotus' own narrative, leading to the conclusion that this was a primary cause of the decision to rebel. According to Adelaide Glynn Dunham, by the turn of the sixth

[20] Munson 2007.
[21] Pelling 2007.
[22] Fornara 1971; Rhodes 2018.
[23] Lang 1968.
[24] Hdt. 1.141
[25] Hornblower 2013, 16. See also Murray 1988, 480; Green 1996, XV.

century Tyranny had become 'an anachronism.'[26] Her argument presupposes an evolutionary model of political development whereby, as A.R. Burn wrote, 'a generation or two has usually been enough time for … [Tyranny] to fulfil its function, grow unpopular and be overthrown'.[27] Yet, even if we are to ignore the tyrannies of western Anatolia and the Hellespont as Persian impositions, the wealth of evidence for stable tyrant regimes in the West speaks against a widespread popular discontent against individual rulers in the late Archaic/early Classical period.[28] These arguments were very much a product of an intellectual milieu that prized the reconstruction of constitutional history as a primary goal of scholarship of the ancient world.[29] In the case of the Ionian states in the late sixth century, the notion that Persian imposition of tyranny somehow arrested an evolutionary development towards representative governance, has been particularly persistent,[30] as is the notion that the excesses and monopolisation of social capital by the Ionian tyrants was the root cause of both their downfall and the revolt itself.[31] More recently, scholars have tried to place the revolt within the wider context of Greek political developments towards the end of the sixth century. Simon Hornblower, for instance, views the unrest and disaffection with tyranny as a consequence of the Ionians' desire to emulate Athens in instituting popular government,[32] though the difference from an evolutionary model is only one of degrees and consequently his argument suffers the same shortcomings.

A second line of interpretation has sought to place the revolt as part of wider anti-Persian attitudes; an embryonic 'nationalist movement' in the words of Evans.[33] Early attempts to explain Ionian recalcitrance in terms of characteristics of the Greek 'race',[34] have been replaced by attempts to attribute the revolt to ideological dissatisfaction with Persian rule and its infringement upon Greek freedom and liberty.[35] Yet it is difficult to ignore the parallels between early twentieth century CE racial characterisations and the language used in more recent claims such as 'the Greeks became subservient to an oriental monarch, which was alien to their way of thinking'.[36]

Scholars who argue for anti-Persian or anti-tyrannical sentiments as motives for the revolt, more often than not, rely on close readings of Herodotus' narrative, problematizing his focus on individual agency as the cause of the revolt and seeking to uncover alternative motivations within his text.[37] Three passages in particular seem to provide some currency for this line of thinking. Firstly, Histaiaos' speech to the Ionian commanders guarding Darius' bridge across the Danube argues that they should not abandon the Persian King due to his role in maintaining their authority and, in his

[26] Dunham 1915, 92. See also Cary and Gray 1926, 218, who see the reaction to Aristagoras' deposition of the Persian-backed tyrannies as evidence for anti-tyrant feelings and Austin 1990, who suggests that Herodotus' narrative here only makes sense if an anti-tyranny motivation for the revolt is posited.
[27] Burn 1962, 195. See below for a discussion of evolutionary models in relation to Miletos' constitutional history.
[28] Mitchell 2013.
[29] See Rhodes 2003 for discussion focusing particularly on the development of Athenian democracy.
[30] Harris 1971, 25-48. Tozzi 1978, 123 suggests that tyranny disrupted the business of the merchant class, while Georges 2000, 21-2; states that, as opposed to earlier tyrannies, Darius' appointees did not 'reflect, and respond to, the real balance and direction of social and political forces.'
[31] Gorman 2001, 129-30. Scott 2005a, 51. See below for a discussion of the monopolization of social capital.
[32] Hornblower 2013, 16, 22, 146. See also Rhodes 2018, 273.
[33] Evans 1963, 118.
[34] Grundy 1901, 85.
[35] Forsdyke 2002, 529-30; Cawkwell 2005, 74-6.
[36] Scott 2005a, 46.
[37] e.g. Hornblower 2013, 309.

absence, their cities would choose *demokratia* over tyranny.[38] In the second instance Aristagoras' public renunciation of his tyranny at Miletos in favour of *isonomia* and his removal of his fellow Ionian tyrants has provided scholars with further grounds to assume disaffection.[39] The third passage comes in the aftermath of the revolt wherein Herodotus claims that Mardonius installed 'democracies' in the Ionian cities, therefore, it has been claimed, the Persians recognised this central cause of the revolt and resolved to prevent future unrest by addressing the problem.[40] Nevertheless there remains a central problem in parsing these underlying motives from Herodotus' account and transferring them onto the historical reality of Ionian/Milesian-Persian relations. For Herodotus, and his late fifth century audience, the language in which these arguments are couched (i.e. the juxtaposition of democracy and tyranny; the use of *isonomia*) reflect the circumstances of the contemporary Peloponnesian War.[41] They cannot be taken *tout court* as the actual historical motivations for the Ionian Revolt, and even less so as a representation of relations between the Persians and Ionia prior to it.

Economic Causes

Alternatively, some scholars have viewed the relationship between Persia and Miletos and the subsequent revolt in terms of economic conditions.[42] According to Herodotus, around 520 BCE Darius imposed a tribute on the peoples of western Anatolia to the sum of 400 talents.[43] Numerous modern scholars have identified the Ionians' dissatisfaction with this sum as a prime cause of the revolt.[44] At face value this does appear to present a clear motive, because of its effects on the economy of the Ionian cities in the two decades prior to the insurrection, but a closer examination of the wider context of Ionian relations with imperial powers casts doubt on this assertion. According to Herodotus, the Lydian King Croesus was the first to extract *phoros* (tribute) from the Ionians though no figure is given.[45] In the fifth century, the Delian League also extracted tribute from Ionia and Caria, possibly as much as 580 talents by 425/4 BCE,[46] far more than Darius' 400 for the whole of western and southwestern Asia Minor a century earlier. Tribute, it seems, was nothing new to the cities of Ionia, and given Miletos' unique position of being bound to the Persian Empire by treaty rather than conquest, it may have shouldered a lighter burden.[47]

An alternative explanation, rooted in the economic sphere, argues that widespread confiscation and redistribution of land to Persian nobles may have been an important factor in

[38] Hdt. 4.137
[39] Cary and Gray 1926, 218.
[40] Rhodes 2018, 273.
[41] Rhodes 2019.
[42] e.g. Dunham 1915, 92-3; Gorman 2001, 129-134; c.f. Georges 2000, 2-10.
[43] Hdt. 3.89-90.
[44] Tozzi 1978, 125-6; Murray 1988, 476; Green 1996, 15; Forsdyke 2002, 529-30; Scott 2005, 47-8; Krentz 2010, 70.
[45] Hdt. 1.6. It is worth noting that Herodotus states that Croesus also established friendships with other Greek states and, though he does not mention Miletos, given his honouring of Alyattes' treaty (Hdt. 1.141) it is possible that they were not subject to tribute.
[46] This figure is based on Unz 1985, 34-41 who sees the increase between the assessments of 430/29 and 425/4 as representing an alteration in recording practices in which the former only recorded the surplus dedicated to Athena whereas the latter also included expenditure.
[47] Hdt, 1.141.

Milesian and Ionian economic stagnation.[48] However, the only evidence to support this supposition post-dates the revolt and is in a context of punishment, rather than cause.[49] Similarly, the argument that the Ionians were unwilling to accept Persian military conscription has also found favour, despite a lack of evidence.[50] Indeed Themistocles' failed attempt to induce the Ionians to defect at Artemisium, if taken at face value, suggests that the Ionian contingents were not so dissatisfied as to seriously consider desertion.[51] Persian imperialism is also thought to have had a deleterious effect on Milesian trade with Naukratis.[52] Nevertheless it seems plausible to follow Herodotus in suggesting that the Persian conquest of Egypt may have encouraged rather than debilitated Ionian trade with Egypt.[53] The effects of Persian imperialism on trade with the Black Sea, although difficult to quantify, have also been suggested as potential causes for the revolt.[54] Regional developments such as the destructions at Histria and disruption at Panticapaeum around the turn of the sixth century as well as Darius' Scythian expedition may have had an effect on the economic development of Black Sea communities, but the decline in Ionian trade with the region may be as much a result of the revolt as its cause.[55] Some scholars have even gone as far as to suggest that the economic effects of the destruction of Miletos' trading partner Sybaris also played a part in the revolt.[56]

Economic arguments however seem to ignore both the nature of Persian imperial power and recent archaeological discoveries from the city of Miletos itself.[57] At this time the Ionian cities still produced large quantities of coinage, often using the Milesian standard, which has been seen as an indicator of economic vigour though the absence of denominations larger than the obol at Miletos itself has elicited surprise.[58] In addition to this argument it has also been noted that, while there may indeed have been a 'hiatus' at Naukratis,[59] this period saw the expansion of Ionian trade into the Levant and Thrace as well as the Persians' own adoption of coinage in this 'monetized' corner of their empire.[60]

[48] Cawkwell 2005, 71-4; Krentz 2010, 70; Hornblower 2013, 17.
[49] Hdt. 6.20. "τῆς δὲ Μιλησίων χώρης αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ Πέρσαι εἶχον τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ πεδίον, τὰ δὲ ὑπεράκρια ἔδοσαν Καρσὶ Πηδασεῦσι ἐκτῆσθαι" ("Of the Milesian chora, the plain around the city were kept by Persians themselves, while the Carians of Pidasa were given the hill country beyond"). Following Cook 1961, Herda et al. 2019 and Bresson 2019 identify Pidasa with the site of Cerit Osman Kale near the modern village of Danışment to the south of Bafa Gölü. However, Sekunda 1991, 92 suggests that this passage refers to Miletos' Maeanderine *chora*, which was an important contributor to the Milesian economy and powerbase according to Greaves 2007. See also Thonemann 2006; 2011, 27-31 for a discussion of this area.
[50] Wallinga 1984, 413-6; Murray 1988, 476 Forsdyke 2002, 529-30; Krentz 2010, 70.
[51] Hdt. 8.22. See below for a discussion of Ionian military action under Persia.
[52] Cary & Gray 1926, 218; Tozzi 1978, 124-5; Murray 1988, 477; Green 1996, 15.
[53] Hdt. 3.139.
[54] Murray 1988, 477-8; Scott 2005a, 42.
[55] For the decline in living standards at Panticapaeum see Tsetskhladze 2004, 236-40 and Alexandrescu 1990 for the destructions at Histria.
[56] Cary & Gray 1926, 218; Murray 1988, 477; Green 1996, 15.
[57] e.g. Niemeier et al. 1999
[58] Balcer 1991, 60 offers no explanation, saying 'the absence of national denominations larger than obols remains perplexing.'
[59] Although this alleged 'hiatus' (Georges 2000, 4) may, in part, be explained by the rise of Heracleion-Thonis as the primary destination for Greek imports during the Persian period (Briant and Descat 1998, 92; Pfeiffer 2010, 18-19).
[60] Georges 2000, 2-12.

Archaeological discoveries in the latter part of the twentieth century began to indicate that the late sixth century was a time of relative prosperity for Miletos with a welter of new monumental construction projects, indicating that there was no lack of wealth in the city or its territory.[61]

During the period of Persian rule, a new monumental marble temple to Athena was built in the city adjacent to the theatre harbour.[62] This grand structure, was built on a large platform and appears to have incorporated the existing altar. Originally dated to the early Classical period, excavations of the Bronze Age levels at the Temple of Athena site during the 1990's discovered a fragment from the supposedly early Classical period temple in a closed well deposit containing pottery dating from the Persian sack of the city at the end of the Ionian Revolt in 494 BCE. [63] This find led the excavators to reappraise the temple's architecture and re-date it to the late Archaic period,[64] although this date is still contested by some.[65] The late Archaic period also saw the construction of a temple to Artemis Kithone on the east terrace of Kalabaktepe hill.[66]

Just outside the city walls, overlooking the Gulf of Latmos,[67] stood the sanctuary for Aphrodite *Oikous* on the low hill of Zeytintepe. The discovery in 1992 of this previously unsuspected Milesian temple has greatly changed our understanding of the city in the Archaic period.[68] Its relatively undisturbed condition and it rich votive deposits make it the richest find spot in the whole of east Greece.[69] The temple's destruction was so total that architectural reconstruction has proved difficult. It has even been suggested that its destruction at the hands of the Persians was systematic and symbolic.[70] Despite its limited architectural remains, a detailed study of its architectural sculptural fragments led the then director of excavations at Miletos, Volkmar von Graeve, to conclude that there

[61] Niemier et al 1999, 406; Greaves 2002, 96.
[62] von Gerkan 1925.
[63] On the original excavation of the building see von Gerkan 1925. For the dating of the structure to the Classical period based on its alignment with the later alignment of the city's grid plan, see Held 2000: 27-29, 30-33. It has even been suggested that the sanctuary may represent the beginnings of the city's grid system – Senff 2006, 168.
[64] Niemeier, Selesnow, Greaves 1999; Weber 1999.
[65] i.e Held 2004.
[66] Kerschner and Senff 1997, 120. This sanctuary may have had particular importance at Miletos due to the Goddess' connection with Neleus and the foundation of the city Callim. *Hymn* 3. 225-7.
[67] Senff and Pantaleon 2008; Greaves 2010, 173. See also Greaves 2004 for the significance of Aphrodite to Miletos and its emigrant settlements.
[68] For preliminary reports see Senff and Heinz 1995, 1997. The most comprehensive publication of the excavations to date is that by Senff (2003), although there have been numerous subsequent publications on individual artefact groups. Specialist studies include: Faunal studies of animal bones (Peters and von den Driesch 1992); Egyptian votives (Hölbl 1999); Cypriot sculpture (Senff 2015); Cypriot terracottas (Henke 2017: 45-56).
[69] Senff 2015: 335. This fact is, of course, just a result of the chance survival of so many undisturbed ritual deposits at the site. There were undoubtedly sites in east Greece, indeed within Milesia itself, that would have been richer – such as the oracle at Branchidai-Didyma (Hdt. 1.92). On votive deposits in Ionia see Greaves 2010 148-149. An earlier sealed *bothros* at Zeytintepe dating to c.700/690-630 BCE (Henke 2017, 54-56) and an seventh century sealed deposit of votive pottery and other artefacts from the temple of Athena at Assessos in Milesia (Zalaitzoglou 2008) show that the generous giving of votive deposits to the gods had long been a Milesian custom.
[70] W-D Niemeier commenting on the paper by Senff 2007, 326, citing the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem by Titus.

were two building phases during the Archaic period, the second of which – together with the re-dated Temple of Athena - might suggest city-wide a programme of temple re-building.[71]

Beyond the city, the rebuilding of the sanctuaries of Apollo and Artemis at Branchidai-Didyma,[72] and the construction of an altar to Poseidon at Tekağaç Burnu[73] in the extreme south west tip of Milesia are further evidence of this state-wide phase of monumental building works. Archaeology also suggests that a number of élite families (*genē)* competed for prestige by making dedications along the sacred way between Miletos and its chief sanctuary at Branchidai-Didyma,[74] much as Samian élite families did on the approaches to the Heraion[75] and Klazomenian élite families did via group burial sites.[76] Prominent dedications along the Sacred Way include the Lion Tomb,[77] the sanctuary at To Akron,[78] and the seated male and female figures and lions lining the final stretches of the road as it approached the temple at Didyma,[79] of which the statue of Chares is the best known (see Figure Two).

[71] von Graeve 2005.
[72] Senff 2006; Tuchelt 2007.
[73] von Gerkan 1915; Greaves 2000.
[74] Herda 2006, 349-350
[75] Carty 2016
[76] Ersoy 2007.
[77] Forbeck and Heres 1997. This remarkable unrobbed tomb is dated by its contents and the two monumental lions that guarded the entrance to the second half of the sixth century BCE.
[78] Tuchelt et al. 1996.
[79] Greaves 2002 117-122; 2010 184-193; Herda 2006.

Figure Two: Seated statue of Chares of Teichioussa from the Sacred Way between Miletos and Branchidai-Didyma. (British Museum 1859.1226.5. Used under Creative Commons Licence)

Such expenditure does not necessarily mean that there were not wider economic difficulties within the Milesian state; indeed, it could even be argued to be a reaction to them as élite individuals would be seen to spend a proportion of their accumulated wealth on ostensibly public projects to offset resentment from subaltern groups.[80] Nevertheless, it seems much more probable that such an extensive program of construction would act as a positive boost to local economies throughout Milesia to the economic benefit of many, not least for those individuals hiring out themselves, their oxen, or their boats to transport marble from Herakleia and Ioniapolis to Miletos or the harbour of Panormos for onward transport to Branchidai-Didyma.[81] In facilitating such extensive rebuilding in such a short space of time the élite and tyranny of the late sixth century city more than likely redistributed some of their wealth across the *asty* and *khora* via employment of craftsmen and others.[82] These are not the conditions we would expect to see in a state in which poverty were encouraging outward economic migration on a mass scale.

Conceptualising the Milesian Élite

It could be argued that the nature of the Milesians' understanding of their own identity was encapsulated in the origin myths of their *polis*. Herodotus' account of the foundation of Miletos,[83] which has gained particular traction within Western scholarship because of its colonialist connotations,[84] assumes a simplistic Greek/Carian cultural binary which disguises the Greek and non-Greek 'Carian' elements out of a previously hybrid Milesian identity which probably only began to be perceived of as bifurcated in the fifth century.[85] Nor was the Herodotean foundation myth the only one in circulation in antiquity. Pausanias' version differs significantly from that of Herodotus because it names Ionians, not Athenians, as the founders of the city and, significantly, the Milesians themselves repeated this story – not the Athenian version of events.[86] However, we often fixate on the Atheno-centric, post-Archaic narrative of Herodotus, even though there are also a number of local Ionian authors who offer different ethno-historical perspectives on Ionian History.[87] Local Ionian authors, such as Ephorus of Kyme, were inevitably influenced by the environment into which they were born and the reality of living in Anatolia would have placed their Anatolian identity in the forefront of their minds, which is a very different experience from that of the Greek island and mainland states.[88] These diverse Greek and local ethno-historical sources form part of a larger contemporary school of 'Milesiography' of which we see only a small section in the surviving sources.[89] Indeed, the standard received teleological narrative that Ionia's mixed identity changed during this time to a point where the Greek element became predominant must now be called into question.[90] Reading beyond the Herodotean version of events that has dominated most previous studies of Miletos, and integrating archaeological and geographic studies of the site and its environs, we can see that during the Archaic

[80] c.f. Salmon 2001, 197.
[81] Salmon 2001, 201; Greaves 2002, 13; Akçer-Ön et al. forthcoming.
[82] Davies 2001, 221-3.
[83] *Hdt*. 1.146.
[84] Mac Sweeney 2013, 45-6.
[85] Greaves 2010.
[86] *Paus*. 7.2.1-6.
[87] Mac Sweeney 2013; 2017.
[88] Davies 2013.
[89] Greaves 2010, 10-14.
[90] Mac Sweeney 2013, 150; *contra*. Roebuck 1961 and Greaves 2010.

period the Milesians maintained their own distinct political structures, cults, culture, and language(s) and that these endured for a long time.

The constitutional history of Miletos can be reconstructed as a standard one for Archaic period Greece – progressing from a mythical monarchy to tyranny to oligarchy and thenceforth to 'democracy'.[91] According to the first century BCE historian Nicolaus of Damascus, the sons of the Milesian king Leodamas avenged their father's murder by his cousin, the tyrant (Am)Phitres.[92] Yet it is the latter's descendants, perhaps ruling as an oligarchy, who we find subsequently being removed by an elected *aisymnetes* named Epimenes.[93] However, the terminology employed in these fragments should give us cause for concern because words such as *tyrannos*, *demos* and even the name of 'Epimenes' (a later Milesian office) cannot be traced any further back than the fifth century BCE.[94] Whatever the reality behind these episodes, it is clear that the Milesian élite did not rule by birth right alone. The city's chief magistracy (the *stephanophor*) was conferred annually during a religious procession that symbolically, and politically, linked the city to the Branchidai-Didyma sanctuary.[95] The religious basis of Milesian political authority is significant because, even though it is commonly held up as being the birthplace of Western rational philosophy in the popular imagination,[96] we must be careful not to reify the Milesian social experience from our Post-Enlightenment perspective.[97] Indeed, the role of Branchidai-Didyma in Archaic period Milesian politics has been largely overlooked and it undoubtedly played a significant role in the city's relations with Persia, as will be discussed below.

With regard to the position of the élite within Milesian society, our sources offer tantalisingly little information. Limited epigraphic material survived the Persian sack of the city and there is no consensus as to how much the content of later inscriptions can reliably inform us about conditions in the Archaic period.[98] The written sources, although less reticent on the subject of Milesian élites, present similar interpretative difficulties. They indicate the occurrence of *stasis* in Archaic Miletos between two groups named as the *aeinautai*/*ploutis* and the *cheiromachia*,[99] or *ousias exonton* (men of substance) and *demoton* (citizenry or people).[100] As we have no confirmatory ethno-historic or epigraphic sources from the city itself, we cannot even be sure that these were even the true names of these groups.[101] The episodes described offer little insight into the character of the antagonist groupings and it is also difficult to discern whether these pairs were homogenous or were themselves umbrella terms for other sub-groups or families.[102] Marxist scholarship has sought to interpret them as competing social classes, literally 'Capital' and 'Labour',[103] but it seems more likely that they were

[91] Jeffrey 1976, 210, Drews 1983, 17-20, Toher 1989, Gorman 2001, 88-121; Greaves 2002, 95-96. See also Gorman 2001, 136-145 on the reference to isonomia in Hdt 5.37 and how this differed from the Greek political concept of democracy. See also Raaflaub 2004.
[92] *Nic. Dam.* F 54.
[93] Nic. Dam. F 53.
[94] Gorman 2001, 91-4.
[95] Robertson 1987; Gorman 2001; Herda 2006, 2011.
[96] e.g. Freely 2012.
[97] Greaves 2010; 2012.
[98] Slawisch 2009; *contra*. Herda 2011.
[99] Plut. *Quaest. Graec*. 32.
[100] Heraclid. Pont. fr. 50 Wehrli. See Parke 1976 for a discussion of this fragment.
[101] Forsdyke 2012.
[102] Gorman 2001, 101-121; van Wees 2008, 29.
[103] Burn 1960, 214; de Ste Croix 1981, 49.

in fact competing aristocratic *hetaireiai* (clubs).[104] This *stasis* seems to have been brought to an end by a commission from Paros, who settled in favour of those land-owners who had continued to prosper throughout.[105]

These two points, the accounts of *stasis* in the literary sources and the archaeological evidence for multiple wealthy kin groups within Ionian society who competitively emulated one another via lavish dedications and funeral rites, raises the prospect that we might need to consider the possibility of there being multiple Milesian élites, rather than a homogenous social stratum that can be considered to have acted as one. We should perhaps envision them as being a diverse set of families in competition with one another, whilst being mindful that in doing so we may be retrojecting a nineteenth or even twentieth century CE concept of 'competition' onto our thinking about the ancient world.[106] We should also remember that whereas family dedications and sanctuaries provide evidence of individual *genē* groups' control of wealth, labour and resources, Bourdieu defined many different forms of capital, of which 'cultural capital' is perhaps merely the best known.[107]

Whatever the precise nature of the Milesian élite, it is clear that by the late fifth century, a single family ruled the city by permission of Persia and no mention is made of pretenders to that position. Perhaps oddly, it is this ruling family rather than their rivals that led the revolt against their own Persian sponsors, although we cannot rule out there being internecine rivalries within the Milesian state.[108] The existence of rival power groupings within the Milesian aristocracy cannot be discounted and the deliberations on the course of the Ionian Revolt indicate that other voices existed to be heard within Miletos.[109] Nevertheless, in this article we will discuss *a* Milesian élite in the singular, rather than élites or élite(s) in the plural, due to lack of evidence. This working definition of the Milesian élite as a collection of diverse cognate groups of individuals and families with considerable command over the capital of the state - all vying for status with one another - does not, however, imply any definition of the 'lower' classes of society. Our flexible and open definition of the Milesian élite is therefore more in keeping with Bourdieu's concepts than with the more rigid class definitions of Max Weber,[110] which Bourdieu sought to challenge.

To sum up, although there is only limited textual or epigraphic evidence about the nature of the Milesian élite during the run up to the Ionian Revolt, a number of recent archaeological discoveries support the idea that, in common with much of the wider Greek world at the time, they were a heterogeneous group who expressed shared values through competitive emulation of one another by means of conspicuous displays of wealth via lavish building projects, votive dedications, and funerals. In trying to explain their defining historical moment – the decision to revolt from Persia – and faced with a single historical source (i.e. Herodotus), commentators have invariably resorted to re-examining the motivations of the two key historical actors, Histaiaos and Aristagoras, through the lens of their own contemporary socio-political contexts, be that colonialist,[111] Orientalist,[112] post-

[104] Jeffrey 1976, 214; Figueira 2015, 329-30.
[105] *Hdt*. 5.28-29, but c.f. Gorman 2001, 52; Guth 2017, 5-7.
[106] Ulf 2011.
[107] Bourdieu 1986; Lizardo 2004 – see below on the transfer of 'capital' from Miletos to Persia.
[108] Chapman 1972; Georges 2000.
[109] *Hdt*. 5.36, 5.125.
[110] Weber 1964.
[111] e.g. Dunham 1915.
[112] e.g. Scott 2005a, 43.

colonialist,[113] or anti-capitalist,[114] or through the contemporary political and military concerns of Herodotus as our key source. However, few people have attempted to contextualise the decision to revolt within the *habitus* of the Milesian élite itself. To do this, we will review the application of *habitus* to Classical studies and how this differs from Bourdieu's original concept, before using it to re-imagine the nature of the Milesian/Persian relationship prior to the Ionian Revolt.

PART TWO: Generative *Habitus*

Since the early 1990's, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* has been deployed across a wide variety of Classical scholarship. However, the use of Bourdieu's original schemata in anglophone scholarship has been criticised for its failure to conceptualise *habitus* as a dynamic, generative structure - instead its primary use has been for illuminating underlying dialogues of class structure and conflict played out with symbolic capital within pre-determined fields of interaction.[115] What all these Classical historical studies have in common is a conception of *habitus* as a structure whereby conflict and power relations can be discussed, whether those relations are gendered[116] or socio-political.[117] *Habitus* has most commonly been employed in Classical scholarship as a constraining set of social practices that serve to limit individual agency, rather than as Bourdieu originally conceived it – a generative structure creating dispositions and structuring and, in return, being restructured by action.[118] Choice is at the heart of Bourdieu's concept *habitus*, which he likened to "the art of inventing",[119] suggesting that it is a creative experience for the individual and should not be considered as being simply limiting.[120]

The destruction of Miletos was truly momentous and the towering scale of that disaster,[121] combined with the limited historical sources about the events that led up to it, can lead us to form a teleological narrative of resistance to Persian rule that ultimately culminated in revolt.[122] However, in this article we apply a generative concept of *habitus* to describe a different, more nuanced and mutually beneficial, pattern of Milesian-Persian interactions as the context from which the revolt was born. Whereas *habitus* has been previously applied to gendered or socio-political power relations, in Bourdieu's conception it is embodied by individuals and we therefore apply it to the Milesian élite as a collective of competing families, as well as to the individual actions of the two best historically attested Milesian figures of the period – Histiaios and Aristagoras. The agency of élite groups and

[113] e.g. Greaves 2010.
[114] e.g. Katchadourian's (2016) application of the eco-political Thing Power methodology. See below.
[115] Lizardo 2004.
[116] Foxhall 1989, 2013; Goff 2004
[117] Cohen 1991, 1995; Griffith 1995; Kurke 1999a, 1999b; Knotterus and Berry 2002; McInerney 2010.
[118] Lizardo 2004: 379-81. However, there are examples where *habitus* has been used to good effect in Classical studies to critically interpret the scholarly fixation on the role of consumption in Greek colonisation - Dietler 2005; 2010.
[119] Bourdieu 1990a: 55.
[120] Anthony Giddens' 'structuration theory' (1984) bears a number of resemblances to Bourdieu's theory of practice, particularly its conception of the recursive nature of agency and structure, though Giddens is more concerned with abstractions of agency than their practical reality. See Martin 2001.
[121] See now Herda 2019, for a discussion of the relationship between pre- and post- destruction Miletos.
[122] Greaves 2010 156, 222-225.

individuals in the ancient past is often understood through consumption patterns and conspicuous displays of wealth, and the Milesian élite certainly did this (see above), but we will focus instead on Miletos' colonial foundations during the period of Persian rule because not only is this a subject which has been largely neglected by previous scholarship but because it is also one of Miletos' defining historical characteristics.[123]

Bourdieu developed the concept of *habitus* to clarify the ways in which the body and the social world are enacted within one another and it is central to his theories of social interaction and his structuralist constructivism methodology.[124] When applied to the behaviour of agents within their own social universe it can describe how an individuals' generative achievements (i.e. their 'agency') is linked with their contextual capital or field (i.e. their 'structure').[125] It also behoves us to recognise that *habitus* is not solely composed of mental attitudes, perceptions and social practices but, rather, it is embodied by the individual themselves.[126] To be true to Bourdieu's original concept, therefore, we should also acknowledge that *habitus* is a cognitive, not just a social, field even to the extent that it informs agents' individual epistemologies.[127] Viewing *habitus* as an embodied, cognitive phenomenon of the individual in this way also allows us to understand it as an element of the emergent concept of distributed cognition.[128] The distributed cognition paradigm allows us to see that *habitus* operates not just on the individual's social sphere, but also their cognitive one and even their perception of the material world because it '…highlights the vital roles played by both physical and cultural resources in cognition'.[129] Under the umbrella of distributed cognition, those who adopt an embedded cognitive view would also see individuals' engagement with the material world as being part of their cognitive processes.[130]

An individual's generative *habitus* is therefore their reactive response to society, inscribed in the body and mind of that biological individual[131] and, by extension through the paradigm of distributed cognition and embedded cognition, the material world around them. However, while Bourdieu emphasises the constraints that impose themselves on people, the *habitus* also allows for individual agency while simultaneously predisposing individuals towards certain modes of behaviour.[132] Despite implying that the agent behaves in ways that are expected of 'people like them', for Bourdieu there are no explicit rules or principles that dictate behaviour, rather '*habitus* goes hand-in-hand with vagueness and indeterminacy'.[133] Practices that are unfamiliar to the individual's cultural groupings may be excluded, which Bourdieu frames as products of opportunities and constraints derived from the individual's earlier life experiences.[134] As a result the most improbable practices are rejected as unthinkable and only a limited range of practices are possible. In our example, the

[123] Bilabel 1920; Ehrhardt 1983; Nawotka 1999; Greaves 2002, 2007; 2010; 2019; Dupont 2007; Cobet et al 2007; Handberg 2013; Herda 2016; Knight *forthcoming a*.
[124] Bourdieu 1981; 1985a.
[125] Bourdieu 1996, 1.
[126] Bourdieu 1998, 81.
[127] Lizardo 2004.
[128] See Cairns 2019 on distributed cognition in Classics and Eidinow 2018 on embodied cognition in Greek Divination.
[129] Anderson, Wheeler and Sprevak 2019: 14-15.
[130] This is part of the 4E Cognition school of thought. See Anderson, Wheeler and Sprevak 2019.
[131] Bourdieu 1985b: 113; 1990a: 70; 1990c: 87.
[132] Bourdieu 1990b: 77.
[133] Bourdieu 1990b: 77.
[134] Bourdieu 1990a, 74.

membership of the Persian Empire allowed members of the Milesian élite to pursue personal *arête* by new means, but it was still to be achieved via established means determined by their pre-existing cultural practices.

It is these two aspects of Bourdieu's definition of *habitus* - that it is embodied in the individual and finds expression in society - informs how we apply a generative concept of *habitus* to an analysis of Milesian élite culture prior to the Ionian Revolt by analysing their experiences as a social grouping and the historically-attested Histiaios and Aristagoras as individuals within that grouping.[135] Bourdieu noted that 'just as no two individual histories are identical so no two individual *habitus* are identical.'[136] Therefore, if we are to recognise that each individual contains within themselves their past, their present, and their aspirations for the future we need to formulate a collective understanding of the context that formed the individual's *habitus.*[137] This collective approach to understanding the individual may at first appear oxymoronic but that is because it contradicts our contemporary Western concept of the 'individual'. For example, Esther Eidinow (2013) examined the behaviour of historical individuals consulting the oracle at Dodona to demonstrate that not only was their self-reflective conception of themselves inherently interdependent on those with whom they shared social and familial relationships but also with the divine. Considering Histiaios' and Aristagoras' actions within the context of the values of élite Milesian society is therefore an essential part of understanding their individual actions.

However, in reconstructing the life experiences of certain historical characters there is a danger that we engage in retrospective speculation about their inner cognitive or emotive states and how these informed, for which we can have no objective evidence. However, our inability to truly understand the ideographic internal processes of historical individuals can be balanced, to some extent, by detailed consideration of their societal and religious context.[138] In the case of Histiaios and Aristagoras, we also cannot separate their actions, as described by Herodotus, from his methods and motivations as a historian. As Sarah Brown Ferrario has observed: "[Herodotus] depicts non-Greeks … as individual agents, Greeks as group agents, and, most importantly, individual agency on the part of a select few Greek leaders who are often involved in problematic relationships with their respective citizen bodies – and whose behaviour is not always entirely distinct from that of their barbarian counterparts" (2014: 60). The actions of our Milesian rebel leaders is therefore consistent with Ferrario's observation and also with the Orientalising view of Miletos as being different from mainland Greece by virtue of its geographic location in Asia and its cultural associations with Lydia and Persia.

We will now examine the ways in which a Milesian (or, more properly, élite Milesian)[139] *habitus* impacted on the strategies adopted by agents (both groups and individuals) to contend, collaborate and manipulate the circumstances that the Persian Empire offered them. As we hope to demonstrate, this strategizing played an important role in defining the parameters of their interaction

[135] Reahy 2004: 439.

[136] Bourdieu 1990c: 46.

[137] According to Bourdieu, aspirations can only be considered a continuum enabled through the social conditionings of one's living history. *Habitus* is an individual's deep, interior epicentre underpinned by a framework of opportunities and constraints (Reahy 2004: 435) and the individual's generative and inventive capacities are therefore infinitely malleable, yet largely unconscious.

[138] Martin and Sørensen 2016.

[139] See Crielaard 2013 on how 'Ionian' identity was synonymous with the dress and behaviour of their élite within the broader Aegean Greek world.

with the Persian Empire. These parameters included ingratiation, integration and interaction with the Persian royal court and the establishment of settlements abroad. They were drawn and re-drawn from the overlapping *habitus* of Milesians, other Ionian Greeks, Anatolians and Persians, and served to negotiate, mitigate and structure interactions between agents creating viable fields within which each agent could seek to realise their influence and ambition. These fields of actions were neither novel reactions to a drastically changed political landscape, nor were they timeless modes of behaviour. Rather, they were generated through interaction and negotiation between agents and capital, and while interlocutors sought to confer the greatest advantage to themselves, the consequences of their actions were often unintended. The particular *habitus* of the Milesian élite, formed and reformed throughout the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, generated multiple modes of behaviour when negotiating the position of agents in various interconnected and overlapping political spheres and our awareness of their *habitus* therefore also needs to be temporally nuanced.

PART THREE: Milesian Élite *Habitus* under Persia

Having established something of the nature of the Milesian élite and how Bourdieu's *habitus* concept can be a generative, rather than restrictive, cognitive phenomenon that informs individuals' decision making, let us consider how this new awareness affects how we consider the Milesian élite's behaviour under Persian rule, and Aristagoras and Histiaios in particular, using a contextualised behavioural approach.

In this article we present a new interpretation of Miletos' relations with Persia prior to the disaster of 494 BCE; one that balances the well-known Herodotean narrative with understandings of the nature of Milesian society and its élite culture as a long-establish *habitus* of social practices, behaviours and cognitive dispositions that had successfully mediated its relations with Lydia long before the arrival of Persia. Indeed, Lydia is crucial to this story because it acted as a precursor to, and buffer between, Miletos and Persia. We will then examine the nature of Persian interaction with Miletos, viewing it from both Milesian and Persian viewpoints, and conclude that Miletos enjoyed considerable scope for independence of action under both Lydia and Persia – most clearly demonstrated by its ability to establish its own overseas settlements whilst under their rule – a fact that the Herodotean narrative of suppression largely downplays. It is this freedom of action, combined with the enduring Greek social practice of acquiring individual honour through war that may ultimately account for Aristagoras' decision to attack Persia.

The Milesian Élite under Lydia

Before we can examine the various ways by which the Milesian élite accommodated themselves into Persian rule, it is necessary to understand their much longer relationship with its Anatolian neighbour Lydia.[140] This Lydian *habitus* can be seen to be a medio-historical process that remained largely unchanged by Persian rule. The Persians generally appear to have respected local cultures and so we can assume that there was little immediate change in the lives of the Milesian élite and their *modus operandi*, indeed continuity and unity-in-diversity were important ideologies in the

[140] Kerschner 2010; Crielaard 2013, Hill 2017.

Persian Empire.[141] The impact of Persian hegemony on western Anatolia may have been as much a discreet transfer of capital from the defeated Lydian Empire as it was a violent rupture. According to Herodotus, the Milesians were bound to Cyrus by treaty rather than by conquest,[142] much as they had been to the Lydian King Croesus and his father Alyattes.[143] As 'guest-friends and allies' of the Lydians,[144] Miletos simultaneously accepted the implications of Lydian regional authority, while strategically placing themselves within it as a favoured group. Thus, the Milesian élite's position was not necessarily subjugated or subaltern but carefully negotiated. Furthermore, traditionally the nature of Persian rule has been viewed as being largely economic, with local rulers being afforded autonomy as long as they provided tribute and did not revolt.[145]

Persian Imperial *Habitus*

'Empire' was an externally imposed power structure within Milesian life but, like any *habitus*, it was both a generative structure as well as a restrictive one (see below). It is our contention that the Milesian élite saw it as an opportunity to continue to extend their overseas settlements, as they had done previously under Lydia. Persian rule was 'light-touch' by nature, as summarised by Pierre Briant: 'In general terms, the imperial government did not intervene in the internal affairs of communities, except in cases of rebellion. The Persians never sought to spread their own cultural and religious values or even their language'.[146] This has led some scholars to suggest that Milesian rulers channelled money, raw materials and labour into the Persian core,[147] but could also channel Persian military power in return. However, having a high degree of agency to act should not be confused with having autonomy in the military sphere and when they did revolt, the Milesians may have had to use Persia's own ships to augment a somewhat small fleet of privately owned Ionian vessels.[148] It was a failure to understand that their arrangement with Persia was the basis of their own power and the limitations that it imposed on them, or the wilful misrepresentation of that power by certain individuals who stood to make personal gains from the Ionian Revolt[149] that ultimately led to the downfall of a long-established and powerful local élite.

Both domestic (Milesian) and imperial (Persian) structures of power and *habitus* generated parameters of behaviour that could be progressively (or transgressively) reinforced, restructured or reinterpreted according to the context of action and the agents. Even though the Milesians were positioned as subaltern to the Persian Empire during C6 BCE, the nature of Persian rule and extended communications networks within their empire meant that a sub-group,[150] such as the Milesian élite, could act as a self-contained *habitus*, as could individuals embodying their own *habitus*. It has been widely shown that Persian practice was to secure power by establishing mutual relationships with

[141] Colburn 2017.
[142] *Hdt*. 1.141.
[143] Badian 2007, 36; Fantalkin 2014, 38-42. On the dating of Lydian engagement with Miletos see Zalaitzoglou 2008.
[144] *Hdt*. 1.22.
[145] Katchadourian (2016 passim.) on what might be described as the 'symbolic economy' of the Persian Empire.
[146] Briant 2017, 17.
[147] Rollinger & Hencklmann 2009; Greaves 2010.
[148] *Diod*. *Sic*. 11.3.7; Wallinga 1993, 118-22; Scott 2005b; *contra*. van Wees 2013.
[149] Osborne 2009, 305-6.
[150] Colburn 2017.

local élites;[151] its relations with Miletos were no exception. However, that is not to say that local agents were not complicit in this 'Persian policy', as Michel Austin writes: 'too little attention has been devoted to the self-interested initiatives by individual upper class Greeks, who approached the Persian king in the justified expectation of gaining power and rewards in return for services rendered to him'.[152]

Having considered how the Milesian élite as a group, and Histiaios in particular, positioned themselves between Miletos and Persia and viewed their own power relations with their new masters, it remains for us to consider how Persia itself may have viewed Miletos. Many early studies of Persia were influenced by contemporary Western views of the Orientalized East.[153] Such views were derived from the construction of anti-Persian tropes and memes within Greek literature and visual arts that depicted Persia as culturally limited and backward by comparison to Greece and not only inspired by Western thinking about the East but actively fed into the formation of the Orientalism movement itself.[154] Over the past 70 years, there has been a gradual shift in the discourse surrounding the character of Persian rule from it being viewed almost entirely through the lens of Greek historical texts, towards a more balanced view that incorporates ethno-historical Persian voices from inscriptions and tablets.[155] It is becoming clear that, as Amélie Kuhrt writes: 'the great socio-cultural diversity of the Persian Empire should not mislead us into dismissing it as a weak and ramshackle structure'.[156] In the past few years, a raft of new publications have set out to challenge previous visions of Persian authority as being frail and disorganized, which ultimately derive from the Hellenocentric and Orientalising viewpoint, with a number of new, more nuanced accounts of the nature of Persian rule in Anatolia and elsewhere.[157]

A notable feature of the archaeology of the Persian period in Anatolia is the near-total lack of any Persian, or even Persianizing, material culture to speak of. In part, this lack of hard archaeological evidence has prompted a new thread of scholarly discussion that questions the position that material goods and their movement across the Persian Empire held as a signifier of imperial power. A World Systems Analysis (WSA) approach to the question of Milesian-Persian interaction, casts the Persian Empire in the role of all-consuming 'core' in a global economic system in which Miletos is the semi-periphery and the Milesian colonies the periphery.[158] However, more recent commentators now see the WSA model as being anachronistic when applied to the Persian style of imperial authority because it envisions an imperial world founded on inherent regional power asymmetries and the continuous extraction and flow of material goods.[159] Janett Morgan rejects such specific exogenous 'prestige goods' theories in favour of a more integrative approach that considers 'social display, competition and identity' over the *longue durée*.[160] Whereas Lori Katchadourian views the transfer of material goods to the Persian court, especially metals, as having symbolic significance that exceeds any putative monetary value they may be ascribed, even to the point of having cosmological significance, applying

[151] Dusinberre 2013.
[152] Austin 1990, 291.
[153] Morgan 2016, 1-6.
[154] Saïd 1978, Bernal 1987; Hall 1989; Harrison 2000; Llewellyn-Jones 2012.
[155] Briant 2017.
[156] Kuhrt 1997, 701.
[157] Marincola et al 2013; Llewellyn-Jones 2013; Dusinberre 2013; Morgan 2016; Katchadourian 2016.
[158] Greaves 2010: 137-143; 2019.
[159] Katchadourian 2016, 31-32; see also Morgan 2016, 8-13.
[160] Morgan 2016, 7.

the contemporary political philosophy of Thing Power.[161] In this context of new understandings of Persian rule, the images of members of local élites holding spheres take on particular symbolic meaning as evidence of a unified imperial material culture and semiotic language (see Figure Three).[162] Similarly, the scenes of members of the Ionian élite offering robes and Ionian cups (presumably made of precious metal) in the Persepolis reliefs is therefore all the more laden with meaning as not only are these the material aspects of their culture that define their identity as members of the Ionian élite, they also (according to Katchadourian) have cosmological significance for the Persian Empire.[163] Despite over a century of archaeological research at Miletos, material evidence for the Persian imperial presence remains slight but these new models of empire suggest that we may be looking for something that isn't there. It was the transfer of symbolic and political capital, rather than material wealth, to the Persian court that was important and by making analogies with the *modus operandi* of the British and other empires of the modern era we are inappropriately retrojecting a reified Western colonialist model of empires of consumption onto ancient Persia.

Darius and Histaiaos

The mechanisms that regulated and transferred authority between Persia and individual Greek *poleis* presents a number of problems. Indeed, how Histiaios came to power is unknown, though it is eminently possible that Darius played a part in his appointment, or at least kept him in power,[164] which might account for his loyalty to the Persian cause. This possibility presents us with a chicken/egg dilemma regarding which came first – Darius' faith in Histiaios as leader of Miletos, or Histiaios' loyalty to the Persian king. As a reward for his loyalty, Histiaios was granted permission to settle a colony at Myrkinos (see below) but, and again for reasons that are not entirely clear, this venture was unsuccessful and Histiaios was taken to the Persian Court in Susa to reside there as a guest of the King.

Histiaios was not the only Greek to be called to serve the Persian court. Others included doctors, such as Democedes of Kroton and Cteisias of Knidos,[165] who were evidently valued for their medical skills. Histiaios may have been chosen to be honored in this way because his skills (e.g. diplomacy, strategy, or local knowledge) made him valuable to the Persian court or because his political power and capacity for independence of action in Miletos made him a potential threat. Taking political hostages was a common tool of ancient diplomacy and could be done for a number of reasons: for the personal protection of the hostage; because the individual posed a threat to the ruling authority if left to their own devices; or because they were held in such affection in their home country that holding them hostage in the centre ensured the good behaviour of the controlled territory.[166] During his stay first at Myrkinos and then at Persian court at Susa (circa 513-499 BCE), Histiaios appears to have retained a degree of personal autonomy, as he was able to appoint his own nephew to run the city in his absence and, thereby, retain a degree of political power within the city, albeit by proxy. We also do not know how popular his rule, or that of Aristagoras, was at Miletos, though the Milesian

[161] Katchadourian 2011; see also Bennett 2010. On "Thing Power" and a critique of links between Ionian material culture and Greek cosmology see Greaves 2013.
[162] Colburn 2017.
[163] Khatchadourian 2011.
[164] Berve 1967, 102; Gorman 2001, 130-33.
[165] Democedes: *Hdt.* 3.129-138. Ctesias: Llewelyn-Jones, Robson 2010.
[166] Amit 1970.

refusal to readmit Histiaios during the Ionian revolt, even if he was not still acting in the capacity of an agent of Persia,[167] suggests that any personal support had had now waned.

Whatever the circumstances of Histiaios' elevation to the court at Susa, there is little doubt that he was placed in a position of great honor as a loyal *philos* ('friend') to the king. Darius' offer of his possessions, his table and his counsels seem to be derived from genuine modes of Persian patronage.[168] It is believed that the title 'friend of the King' denoted a rank of great importance within the Persian court, one who would dine within the king's dining room (though the monarch himself ate alone), and Darius' offer of his counsels may be an allusion to Histiaios as one of the chosen few who would afterwards be invited to converse with the king; 'an exceptional honour, because it was during these symposia that important matters were discussed'.[169]

This raises an interesting problem when considering Histiaios' agency because his unique position as being simultaneously a member of the Milesian élite and a member of the Persian court effectively made him a 'trans-colonial' agent capable of operating in both spheres and gaining advantage from each.[170] Looking beyond the specific administrative circumstances of empire we can use generative *habitus* to see how Histiaios embodied his agency as an empowered individual agent who carefully negotiated his position between his membership of both the Milesian élite and the Persian court to his own personal advantage.

Ionians at Susa

Such a reading assumes a degree of parity between the Milesians and their new Persian masters. This raises the question of how important the Persians considered Miletos to be prior to the Ionian Revolt. It is perhaps telling that there is only one instance of the use of the Ionian Greek dialect among the Persepolis fortification tablets[171] and surprisingly few discernible Ionian artistic influences in Achaemenid art, in which Ionians appear mostly as artisan stone-cutters and architects.[172] However, Ionians are depicted in Group XII of the Apadana reliefs at Persepolis, designed and carved during the reign of Darius (see Figure Three). These sculptures, showing the peoples of the empire bringing gifts and tribute to the great King, were designed to 'symbolise the magnetic force of imperial centeredness'.[173] Their affective performative impact on the viewer would be to reinforce the unity-

[167] *Hdt*. 6.4-5, Chapman 1972, 560-8.
[168] *Hdt*. 5.24; Briant 2002.
[169] Briant 2002: 308.
[170] Tran-colonialism as a term is very much in vogue in postcolonial scholarship at the moment, but remains somewhat ill-defined. During the late nineties it referred specifically to élite power transactions between colonial élites in South Asia and is has since come to fill conceptual gaps left by the colonial and the postcolonial (Dodson and Hatcher 2012). Ewa Łukaszyk (2018) extends the definition beyond that of a trait that may be passed between cultures to describing it as a moment in which an individual transcends the limitations of their own culture to embody a new 'liberated' version of themselves and it is in this sense we use the term here.
[171] Fort. 1771. See Schmitt 1989: 303-4; Root 1997; Kuhrt 2007: 785 no. 14n.3; Rollinger and Henckelman 2009; Vlassopolous 2013: 49. According to Lewis (1977: 12-3) it reads "οίνος δυο | | μάρις Τέβητ" (wine, two maris, Tebet"). This records a ration of wine totalling just under 3.3 litres distributed in the month of Tebet in the Babylonian calendar. Balcer 1983: 261, writes that the scribe was a Samian while Lewis (1977: 13), noting the two seal-impressions, merely suggests "Somewhere out on the administrative circuit there was someone to whom it came most naturally to write in Greek and who, moreover, knew that there was someone at the administrative centre who would know what it meant."
[172] Balcer 1983: 261; Boardman 2000.
[173] Root 2000: 116-8.

in-diversity model of empire espoused by the Persians while reinforcing the hierarchical nature of the system.[174] Those figures identified as Ionians, seem to be presenting bundles of clothes similar to those they are wearing, consisting of a *chiton* underneath a *himation*; this combination recalls 'the sartorial custom of the Archaic period among mature élite males of East Greece'[175] who were noted for their 'trailing garments' (Alkaios fr.322 [Voigt]).[176] Similarities have been noted between this attire and that adorning the statue of Chares of Teichioussa at on the sacred way at Branchidai-Didyma (see Figure Two).[177] This demonstrates the Persian ability to reproduce in this relief the bodily *habitus* of their élite subjects through their dress,[178] subtly altering its meaning within their own ideology. In presenting these garments to the King the Ionian élite are shown to be recognising the king's place within their *habitus* and by receiving them Darius is presenting himself simultaneously as a paradigm of the diversity of the empire and also demonstrating his affinity with his subjects and their cultural praxis. Yet, in handing over to the king the signifier of their own status as an élite, the hierarchical nature of their relationship is reinforced. This dual meaning would not be lost an Ionian observer such as Histiaios. The position of subject peoples as both integral yet subordinate, depending on their loyalty, is effectively displayed through Persian manipulation of local *habitus* to underpin the nature of their power over the Ionians and, at the time same time, the rewards to be accrued through the cooperation of subject peoples that was vital to the stability of the imperial system.[179]

[174] Colburn 2017.
[175] Root 2007: 182.
[176] See Criellard 2013 for discussion of the importance of dress to élite Ionian identity.
[177] Root 2007: 213 n.18.
[178] Colburn 2017: 880-1.
[179] Root 2007: 205.

Figure Three: Group XII of the Apadana reliefs at Persepolis, Ionians bearing gifts. From left: two carrying bowls, one carrying Ionian cups, two carrying cloth, and one carrying spheres.

The Persian Empire and Milesian Religious Institutions

Although diversity of local practice was tolerated, indeed instrumentalised,[180] to serve the needs of Persian rule we should not assume that the actions of local élites and institutions indicate an absence of oversight by their Persian masters. A fascinating insight into the granularity of Persian control of local religious institutions comes in a letter from Darius I to Gadatas the governor of Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, [181] which was a near neighbor of Miletos.[182] Referring to Gadatas as his *doulos* ('slave'), Darius threatens to punish him over the cultivation of unconsecrated land by the sacred gardeners of Apollo. Given the great king's concern with such relatively minor religious infractions, we can certainly assume that the actions of the great oracle of Apollo at Branchidai-Didyma would not have escaped his attention. In the C6 BCE the oracle's historically attested[183] and presumed[184] pronouncements were all pro-Persian, which has led some commentators to conclude that the Branchidai priesthood were free to pursue policy independently of the Milesian *polis*.[185] However, such an assumption is again based on teleological thinking about the inevitability of the Ionian Revolt even though, up until the moment of revolt itself, the Milesian élite had also shown loyalty to the Persian King.

Miletos was intimately linked to Branchidai-Didyma, both physically through the New Year's procession along the sacred way from the city to the temple described in the famous *Molpoi* inscription,[186] and politically via close cooperation and mutual validation between the sanctuary and the ruling Milesian élite.[187] The New Year procession was organised by the *Molpoi*, a college of priests of the city's temple of Apollo Delphinos, who elected the powerful political office of the *Aisymnetes/Stephanephoroi*. The *Stephanephor* ('crown-wearer') led the procession and was the eponymous magistrate after whom the Milesian calendar year would be named.[188] Although the precise nature and extent of the political powers of the *Molpoi* and the *Aisymnetes* are disputed,[189] what is not in doubt is that they derived their office, titles and authority from religious institutions. In this context it is interesting to note that the tyrant Aristagoras father's name, Molpagoras, appears related to the *Molpoi*,[190] showing the connection between this religious institution and the Milesian élite. The formal political offices of the state were therefore, at least symbolically, theocratic in nature

[180] Katchadourian 2016: 22-23.
[181] Brandenstein & Mayrhofer 1964: 91-98.
[182] Although, like Priene, the location of the Archaic period city of Palaimagnesia has yet to be found (Bingöl 2007).
[183] *Hdt*. 1.159; *Strab*. 14.1.5.
[184] Parker 1985, 316; citing *Hdt*.1.174.
[185] Furtwängler 2014.
[186] Milet I.3 133; Gorman 2001, 176-96; Herda 2006, Greaves 2002, 109-29, 2012, 180-93; Slawish 2009; Slawisch and Wilkinson 2018
[187] Herda 2011.
[188] Milet I.3 122-9; SEG 45 1620.
[189] Gorman 2001, 94-101.
[190] *Hdt.* 5.30.

and the procession embodied a physical, political and religious relationship between the city and the temple. The extent to which Branchidai-Didyma was independent of Miletos is a matter of opinion,[191] but the degree to which the city was dependent on the temple, which gave rise to its most important magistrates, oversaw it religious practices,[192] and may even have sanctioned its prodigious colonisation is clear.

The Persians had experience of dealing with theocratic 'temple-states' elsewhere, including the second temple governance of Judah which arose during the Persian hegemony[193] and given the prominence of the oracle of Branchidai-Didyma in Milesian affairs it is conceivable that this is also how they saw Miletos. Branchidai-Didyma clearly prospered during the period of Persian domination and the main temple building was rebuilt in the second half of C6 BCE, at around the time of Persia's entrance into Western Anatolia and it evidently attracted lavish dedications.[194] The oracle's known pronouncements may have been pro-Persian but we know nothing about how the oracle conducted itself during the crucial few years of the Ionian Revolt. The fact that the Milesian élite discussed seizing its treasures to pay for their campaign is significant,[195] although this should not necessarily be read as evidence that the temple had sided with Persia. Neither should the fact that the temple's priesthood was carried away during the sack of Miletos, as they may have been seen by Persia as simply a valuable resource due to their prophetic powers.[196] We may never fully understand the complex relationships between city and temple and the external perceptions of both by Persia although, if the Milesian élite could co-opt the religious authority of Branchidai-Didyma to their revolutionary cause, this would certainly have been a significant boost in their revolt from Persia.

As Katchadouruian notes, it is not in the core but rather in the peripheries where consumption happens in ancient world-empires.[197] The confiscation of the material wealth and even the eponymous Branchidai priesthood from Branchidai-Didyma[198] and, presumably, the rich dedications of other sanctuaries in the Milesian can therefore be reimagined as a symbolic recall of the capital that the Milesian élite had acquired through their association with Persia, perhaps even extending to the symbolic destruction of their temples (see above on the temples of Aphrodite).

DISCUSSION: The Milesian *Habitus* of *Arête*

Having examined the nature of the Milesian élite under Persia and how a generative interpretation of Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* differs from the way in which it has previously been applied within the Classics, we will now combine these into a consideration of the Milesian élite's *habitus* of *arête* following the model proposed by Lynette Mitchell (2013).

Mitchell has suggested that individual rule in the Archaic and Classical world was predicated upon the *arête* ('virtue') of the ruler.[199] *Arête* was enhanced and maintained through three principle

[191] Greaves 2002, 123; Rubinstein & Greaves 2004, 1059.
[192] e.g. Milet I.3 132a, an oracular response forbidding women from the sanctuary of Herakles.
[193] Fried 2004.
[194] *Hdt*.1.92, 2.159; Furtwängler 2009, 2014; Greaves 2012; Dusinberre 2013.
[195] *Hdt.* 5.36.
[196] Burkert 1994, 60; Greaves 2010, 169.
[197] Khatchadourian 2016, 32; citing Woolf 1990.
[198] Greaves 2010: 169; 2012.
[199] Mitchell 2013, 17, 47.

means: success in Panhellenic sports competitions, the foundation of cities, and warfare. Success in these activities enhanced prestige and marked out the ruler as *kalos* ('good'), implicitly demonstrating their illustrious ancestry and suitability for high office. The agonistic culture of peer rivalry amongst the aristocracy meant that there was constant pressure to find new opportunities to demonstrate one's fitness to rule and, as tyrant, it was theoretically possible to monopolise such sources of *arête*. The maintenance of this cultural system necessitated mutual acceptance and understanding of the social rules underlying these practices.[200] Archaic Greek élites thus created an intra-poleis community based around activities such as athletics[201] and the symposium[202] and bound together by ties of *xenia* ('guest-friendship').[203]

Let us now consider how each of Mitchell's three ways to *arête* can be seen to have applied to Archaic Miletos:

Sports

Of the three routes to *arête* our sources are almost completely silent about Milesian participation in Panhellenic games. Only one Archaic victor is known, Polymestor in the Boys Stadion in 596 BCE, and anecdotal evidence suggests that his was a natural talent rather than the product of élite athletic training.[204] We also know next to nothing about the Milesians' own Great Didymeia festival in the Archaic period, although there were certainly athletic contests in Classical times.[205] Games may also have been held near the Milesian colony of Olbia in the northern Black Sea,[206] but again the evidence is later, and this may have been a strictly local affair and there is no evidence to suggest that athletic competition was as highly valued by the Milesian élite as that of, say, contemporary Greek Sicily.[207]

The Foundation of New Cities ('Colonisation')

The foundation of new cities had long offered the Milesian élite opportunities to enhance their personal *arête*. In addition to being 'a display of leadership and a demonstration of power through land acquisition',[208] it would also ensure the prestige and heroisation of the founder through the establishment of a hero cult in the colony after his death.[209] Miletos was a famed coloniser and is credited as being the founder of more overseas settlements than any other Archaic Greek city.[210]

[200] Wenger 1998.
[201] Papakonstantinou 2019, 33-6. See below.
[202] Wecowski 2014.
[203] Herman 1987, 34-40.
[204] Eus. *Chron*. 72 = *Sext. Iul. Afric*. F 65.
[205] SEG 55 921 = SIG 590; Fontenrose, 1988: 67-74; Herda 2011: 65.
[206] Hedreen 1991.
[207] Baitinger 2016.
[208] Mitchell 2013, 77.
[209] Malkin 1987: 254-260; Mitchell 2013: 78. Although in the case of the Athenian Hagnon, founder of Amphipolis in 437 BCE, death was not even a necessary precursor to heroic honours (Thuc. 5.11). c.f. Knight forthcoming b for the suggestion that this institution developed primarily in the C6.
[210] Plin. *NH.* 5.122. See also Milet VI.3 1111 = CIG 2878.

Colonisation was part of Milesian identity and they saw themselves as a colonising or migrant polity.[211] Understanding Milesian colonisation under Persia provides an interesting and uniquely Milesian perspective on how the city accommodated its long-established *modus operandi* into the new *habitus* of Persian rule.

A generative *habitus* approach allows us to view the interfaces between Persia, Miletos and the Milesian 'colonies' as being both fluid and complex according to the specific *habitus*, agent and capital involved in each foundation. This Milesian *habitus* can be seen to engender a sense of mobility, perhaps based on/contributing to their perception of a mythologised Ionian Migration,[212] and this in turn could inform and structure the decision-making of individual Milesian agents who chose to travel and settle overseas.[213] The Archaic Greek overseas settlement movement was a dynamic process[214] and the particular context of decision-making, action, and forms of capital deployed could be very different for each settlement and each agent. That is to say, the established Milesian *habitus* of overseas settlement offered individuals the chance to move and settle in ways that were advantageous to them as their individual circumstances allowed and the Milesian institution of 'colonisation' was itself changed by their actions.

Greek colonisation under the Persian Empire is a subject that has generally received little attention for three reasons. Firstly, the Persians are generally cast in the role of antagonist within Greek history with colonisation being a uniquely Greek response to the encroachment and eventual subjugation of the eastern Greeks by Persia,[215] an interpretation that maps neatly onto an ancient colonising narratives that emphasise the role of the *metropolis* (mother-city).[216] Secondly, most of the major East Greek overseas settlements had been founded prior to the rise of Lydia and the Persian Empire.[217] Finally, as we shall see, there is a relative dearth of archaeological evidence from the earliest levels of known C6 BCE colonial settlement sites and our only evidence comes from later literary testimony. Such sources indicate that the Persians may actually have encouraged Greek overseas settlement, perhaps even prescribing it in some cases. This can profitably be analysed, per Elspeth Dusinberre (2013: 3-8), as an 'authority-autonomy' model of imperialism, accommodating autonomous Milesian agency while simultaneously facilitating directions in which it could be co-opted into furthering imperial interests.

Let us briefly consider the Milesian foundation of Myrkinos and Phasis during the period of Persian rule to illustrate the complex interplay of relations at work:

> ***Myrkinos:***[218]According to Herodotus, Histiaios requested permission to found Myrkinos as a reward for securing Darius' escape from Scythia in c. 513 BCE. The site was settled with

[211] Mac Sweeney 2013; Knight forthcoming a.
[212] Crielaard 2013 suggests that these Ionian Migration stories may, in part at least, have been invented to create mythical backstories to justify the rule of Ionian élite dynastic families.
[213] For habitus as *praxis* see Burmeister 2017
[214] Osborne 1998; Yntema 2011.
[215] Hdt. 164-5; Vlassopoulos 2013: 104
[216] Dougherty 1993: 6, 19.
[217] Tsetskhladze 1994: 125-6.
[218] *Hdt*. 5.11. The location of Myrkinos is yet to be securely identified. Hammond and Griffith 1979, 68; Papazolgou 1988, 390-1; Loukopoulo 2004, 862; suppose it was located at modern Palaiokomi in the foothills of Mount Pangaeum where several Roman era inscriptions have been uncovered (Myrkinos remained in existence until at least the first century CE, e.g. *Strab*. F. 33), though c.f. Pedrizet 1894: 430-1, their *editio*

support from the local Edoni people and secured through the removal of their rival Paeonians, a situation that was later reversed with disastrous consequences by Aristagoras.[219]

Along with Boryza and Doriscus, Myrkinos was established as a fortified settlement to secure the coastal roads of Darius' Thracian conquests.[220] Within this imperialising context the Persians were presented with a potential outlet for Greek ambitions.[221] The area around Mount Pangaeum had long been coveted as a potential area of Greek settlement.[222] Facilitating settlement there would impress upon the Milesian élite the continued benefits of collaboration while simultaneously advancing Persian interests, but it was Histiaios himself, as principal of the Milesian state, who stood to gain most as founder of the new settlement. At Myrkinos, Histiaios grasped an opportunity to cement his authority and enhance his *arête*. Once granted royal prerogative for the settlement, the actual mechanics of the foundation were left in his hands.[223] Herodotus suggests that Histiaios physically participated in the endeavour, leaving Aristagoras as his deputy at Miletos. His description of Aristagoras as *epitropos* ('guardian') indicates that Histiaios may have retained symbolic authority at Miletos, from which he continued to derive *arête*.[224] However, Myrkinos presented an opportunity to attain a different kind of authority - heroic *arête*.

Heroic honours as founder were not the only benefits of foundation. It would also provide the opportunity to reward élite and non-élite supporters alike with opportunities for trade and personal enrichment.[225] Myrkinos' connection to the coast via the Stymon provided a communications route and created a new node within established north Aegean trade networks.[226] Its material resources were timber, wood for oars, silver and manpower, fertile land and commercial opportunity.[227] Its timber, a scarce and valuable resource in antiquity at the best of times, had many possible uses.[228] Histiaios' primary interest may have been the building of warships, as Herodotus alludes to with his comment on oars,[229] although this does

princeps, who assigned them to Amphipolis. Here we tentatively follow Demetrios Samsaris' (1976: 141) correlation of ancient Myrkinos with the modern village of the same name. This site would have been advantageous, positioned as it is on a raised area above what would have been the ancient Lake Kerkinitis (since drained) with the River Angitis to the north. See also Bouzek and Graninger 2015, 14 for the navigability of the Strymon from Kerkinitis to the Aegean, which could facilitate trade between the coast and the interior.

[219] Isaac 1986, 18; Delev 2007, 112; Vasilev 2015, 87

[220] Isaac 1986, 18; Lavelle 1992, 20; Georges 2000, 10; Sarakinski 2011, 95-6.

[221] The Milesians the only ones who were involved in colonising Thrace; there was also the relationship with the other Ionian states that had colonial interests in the region to be considered. In relation to the first foundation of nearby Abdera in 654 BCE, C. Danov wrote: 'There can hardly be any doubt that there existed an agreement between Miletus and Clazomenae which regulated questions concerning the spheres of colonial expansion and economic and political influence along the southern shores of Thrace'. If this putative arrangement were still in place when Histiaios requested to settle at Myrkinos in 512 BCE, it might be taken as evidence that the newly Persian reality and his personal position within it gave him a basis from which to over-ride a long-established status quo of finely balanced inter-polis power relations within Ionia that had previously restrained Milesian ambitions, but such a conclusion must remain highly speculative.

[222] Wallinga 1984, 418.

[223] Sarakinski, 2011, 95-6; Georges 2000, 10.

[224] *Hdt*. 5.24, 106.

[225] Wecowski 2014, 24-5

[226] Archibald 2013, 135.

[227] *Hdt* .5.23; Lavelle 1992, 19-20.

[228] Bresson 2016, 73.

[229] *Hdt*. 5.23

not imply that he intended to create a Milesian navy in anticipation of an as-yet-unforeseen Ionian Revolt, rather than selling them or supplying them to Persia. Manpower, in the form of slaves and/or mercenaries, would be a significant boon to any new community. However, it is Myrkinos' access to silver and, though unmentioned by Herodotus, gold that have most often caught the imagination of modern scholars.[230] There remain doubts over whether the Greeks or Persians themselves took control of the Pangaeum mines but their proximity to Myrkinos would certainly have been a factor in its settlement.[231]

Phasis: Kolchis' incorporation into the Persian sphere is difficult to date and estimates range from the beginning of the C6 BCE to the early C5 BCE.[232] Early C6 BCE pottery is present in local settlements indicating that trade may have predated settlement.[233] We also have the name of the founder of Phasis, one Themistagoras whose earlier career may have included a stint as eponymous *aisymnetous* at Miletos.[234] The combination of this role and his position as founder of Phasis, could potentially be identified as a case of an élite individual receiving honours which could ensure the maintenance of his personal *arête* without presenting a threat to the current Milesian tyranny. The eponymous *aisymnetai* being of short duration, the opportunity to found a colony might represent a more permanent solution to the problem of an agonistic élite or, as a 'relief mechanism for pressure for upward mobility'.[235] Individual élite agents could simultaneously be rewarded for loyalty to the tyrant whilst still under suspicion.

A reigning tyrant could ill-afford the continued absence necessary for multiple foundations, even if he did not subsequently reside in the colony or deputise a relative to manage the *metropolis*, as Histiaios did with Aristagoras when he founded Myrkinos. Yet, the foundation of colonies could provide a potential outlet for civic tension within highly competitive élites, maintaining internal stability in the metropolis.[236] Although a tyranny might in theory monopolise opportunities for *arête*, in practice the internal *habitus* of competition within the Milesian élite was far more complex, with various agents deploying differing strategies of support and opposition to accumulate the symbolic capital available through office-holding and foundation. Our conjectured Themistagoras may not have achieved both, but all the same his/their case demonstrates the possibilities of interaction with the élite Milesian *habitus*.

[230] Balcer 1988, 11; Georges 2000, 5, 15; Badian 2007, 38; Vasilev 2015, 119.
[231] Lavelle 1992: 16-17.
[232] Braund 1994: 96-103; Lordkipanidze 2000: 53-61; Tsetskhladze 2013: 301; see Tsteskhladze 2018: 522-33 for recent discoveries of Achaemenid material.
[233] Tsetskhladze 2013: 296-7.
[234] Milet I.3 122 = SEG 45 1620. See Pomp. 1.108 and Lordkipanidze 2003 for Themistagoras as founder of Phasis, though Lordkipanidze (2000, 54) doubts the identification with the individual named on the Milesian *aisymnetai* list. Counting back from the eponymous magistracy of Alexander the Great, we arrive at a date of 525/4 BCE for the first entries on the list, although Rhodes (2006) notes that lines with more than one entry may represent replacement officials thus downdating the inscription to 522/1 BCE. Gorman 2001, 141 and Herda 2011 prefer a date around 540 BCE taking into account that there could have been no *aisymnetai* between the Persian destruction in 494 BCE and the restoration of the city in c. 479 BCE. If the Themistagoras named by Pomponius Mela is the same individual as the one on the list, then the latter scheme, which would place his magistracy in 521/0 or 518/7 BCE rather than between 435/4 and 433/2 BCE, is to be preferred.
[235] Figuiera 2015: 326-7.
[236] Strabo 6.3.2-3, on Sparta.

> Economic opportunity also seems to have played a part in establishing the Kolchian *apoikiai*,[237] although whether trade was a cause or consequence of overseas settlement is a moot point.[238] The establishment of settlements at the end of the previous century around the Black Sea at Sinope, Trapezus and Olbia amongst others had already established a trade network probably geared towards furthering the interests of Milesian and Pontic traders in an under-utilised region, to which Phasis was a latecomer.[239] Whether or not Phasis was founded when Kolchis was already part of the Persian Empire, it was at least a 'buffer-zone' between the Persians and the tribes of the Western Caucasus.[240]

As with Myrkinos, it is possible to see multiple contiguous demonstrations of agency, wherein Milesian overseas settlement becomes a mode of action that simultaneously asserts and refines the influence of Persia within the settled region whilst simultaneously assuaging and managing the ambitions of the Milesian élite.

Finally, if we are to consider overseas settlement as an established *habitus* that the Milesian élite co-opted to serve their personal ambitions and those of their new Persian masters, we must also consider what constituted a specifically Milesian *habitus* of 'colonisation'. According to Greek historical tradition of the Classical era, an *oikist* (founder) would always consult the oracle at Delphi before founding a colony.[241] However, we have no records of Milesians consulting Delphi on any matter, let alone colonisation. The telling of foundation stories within a recognisable literary trope calls into question the historicity of the role of Delphic oracle in early foundations.[242] Before the Classical period, Delphi does not appear to have had any great panhellenic status and this may account for why we have no foundation stories that connect it to Miletos as a colonial *metropolis*. Whether or not the oracle at Branchidai-Didyma served a similar function during the foundation of Milesian colonies is an open question.[243] There is one piece of evidence that might be argued to suggest that it did: the Berezan bone tablet with its cryptic Didymean magical text.[244] The relative absence of named *oikists* from Milesian colonies is remarkable given the sheer number of colonies that Miletos is thought to have founded and given the fact that several of them, such as Olbia and Istria, have significant epigraphic sets and historical traditions of their own.[245] However, it is difficult to argue that the lack

[237] Gyenos was apparently founded by merchants - Pomp. 1.110; Braund 1994: 78, 103.
[238] Tsetskhladze 2006: 198.
[239] Hind 1988; Greaves 2007: 16-19; De Boer 2013.
[240] Tsetskhladze 2013: 301-3.
[241] Curtius 1861; Gwynn 1918; Forrest 1957; Malkin 1987, 1989; Psalti 2014, but c.f. the cogent criticisms of Londey 1990.
[242] Londey 1990; Dougherty 1993.
[243] Fontenrose 1988: 93. Malkin (1987, 17) accepts the possibility but draws attention to Herodotus' claim (1.165) that the Ionian Phokaians consulted Delphi prior to the foundation of Kyrnos. Whether or not Branchidai-Didyma was involved in the foundation of Milesian colonies in the Archaic period, during the Hellenistic period it was certainly believed that it had done, as evidenced by Apollonia-on-the-Rhyndacus approaching Miletos to determine if it was itself a Milesian foundation - Milet I.3 155; Greaves 2002: 127-128; Greaves 2007, Knight forthcoming a.
[244] SEG 36 694; Dubois 1996: 146-155 no 93. Burkert 1994; Rusyayeva 1986; Herda 2016 accept this as a genuine Didymean foundation oracle, while Onyshkevych 2002 and Penkova 2003 are more inclined to see it as functioning in an Orphic or Hebdomadic context.
[245] In comparison to the 27 colonies of Italy and Sicily studied by Jonathan Hall in which 20 had named oikists (Hall 2008), out around 50 known Milesian colonies only 7 potentially historical founders from Miletos at 5 settlements can be identified: Themistagoras and Histiaios (above), Anaximander at Apollonia Pontica (Ael. *VH*. 3.17), Koos and Kritias preceded by Habron at Sinope (Ps-Scym. 955-8) and Hermochares at Kardia (Steph. Byz.

of an *oikist* is a uniquely Milesian feature based on *ex silencio* argument alone and their absence from the historical record is likely to be a consequence of the fact that we do not have preserved traditions for Milesian foundations in the way we do for states that are routinely portrayed as consulting Delphi. Whether this means that they consulted Branchidai-Didyma instead will depend on the extent to which the tradition of oracular consultation before foundation was genuine PanHellenic phenomenon of the Archaic period, or whether it is an allegorical trope of later literary tradition.[246]

The earliest levels of many overseas settlements are indicative of small-scale trading or fishing concerns.[247] Initial, sometimes seasonal or periodic settlement, informed by a *habitus* of mobility and the search for sources of economic capital, may have functioned to enhance the subsequent mobility of agents and create the conditions for consolidated overseas settlement. The *habitus* of Milesian traders and that of the Milesian élite therefore overlapped and converged when such fishing posts were first settled as trading posts and then later consolidated into formalised settlements that bestowed arête on their notional founders.[248]

However, there is another aspect of Milesian colonisation where oracles may have been involved in the transfer of an important aspect of *habitus* from the *metropolis* to the colonies and that was in the transmission of cult practice. One thing that many Milesian colonies did have in common is their legal structures and calendar.[249] Given that the calendar of any Greek city was based around the festivals and sacrifices of the key gods of the city, this may be taken as evidence for enduring religious connections between Miletos and its colonies. In this context it is also interesting to note that the Milesians retained their own calendar, which was similar to that of Athens, rather than adopting the Babylonian calendar, which the Persians promoted as a means to unify their empire.[250]

A number of Milesian *apoikia*, particularly in the Hellespont, participated in the revolt from Persia, including Abydos, Lampsakos, Paisos, and Parium[251] as well as Kyzikos, Prokonessos, and Artake.[252] This led Simon Hornblower to state 'colonial loyalty should be added to the causes of the revolt in its wider extension.'[253] The reasons for these states' participation in the revolt cannot be reduced to merely the granting of freedom from tyranny offered by Aristagoras,[254] or some sense of devotion to the *metropolis*. Histaiaos may have had *xenia* relations with the élites of these Hellespontine *poleis*, indeed his deputy in the region was an Abydean, Bisaltes.[255] Furthermore, there are two extant inscriptions describing *isopoliteia* between Miletos and Kyzikus and Kios.[256] According

358.3-4). According to Eusthathis (*Comm. Dio.*) Hermonassa was apparently named after either its founder Hermon of Mytilene, or Hermonassa Semandrus of Mytilene's wife, see also Minns 1913: 570. Stephanus of Byzantium (*s.v.*) claims that the founder of Panticapaeum was Panticapes, allegedly a brother of Medea. See Braund 2002 for discussion.

[246] Just as Crielaard (2013) notes that the foundation myths of the Ionian Migration may have been invented by the Ionian élite seeking to justify their exalted status as founders of their home cities, so too may the invention of colonial foundation stories and the heroisation that ensued (see above).

[247] Greaves 2002: 104-9, 2007; Doonan et al. 2016.

[248] Greaves 2010, 137-143.

[249] Ehrhardt 1983: *passim*; Bowden 1996; Nawotka 1999.

[250] Gorman 2001: 37-38; Colburn 2017.

[251] Hdt. 5.117.

[252] Hdt. 6.33.

[253] Hornblower 2013: 23

[254] Hdt. 5.37, Austin 1990: 300.

[255] Hdt. 6.26. On Aristagoras' *xenia* connections to Naxos, see above.

[256] Kyzikos: Milet I.3 137; Kios: Milet I.3 141. See Gorman 2001: 189-190 for discussion.

to John Graham, who notes that these reflect 'traditional' (*patria*) regulations, the combined content of these inscriptions and analogous examples, suggests that the original provisions can be dated 'at the latest in the fifth century'.[257] It seems quite possible that these close connections, whether contemporaneously enshrined in law, probably existed around the time of the revolt. Thus, it may have been to these close relations that Aristagoras appealed to persuade the Hellespontine cities to revolt.[258] Furthermore, though we do not know the chronology in which these communities turned against the Persians, the general anti-Persian tenor may have also persuaded other non-Milesian settlements of the region to revolt. This demonstrates the effectiveness of Miletos' network of *apoikia* in providing a basis for wider action particularly if manipulated through institutions of *xenia* and *isopoliteia*. The *habitus* of Aristagoras and Histaiaos, as part of a generalised Milesian *habitus* could generate powerful representations of inter-relations and cooperation which could be utilised to widen the scope of the revolt.

There were also other important players in the foundation of these settlements, namely the local élites that the Milesians encountered. During the foundation of Myrkinos, the Milesians encountered the Edoni, later part of the Odrysian Kingdom.[259] The Odrysian élite favoured Achaemenid forms of silver vessels and the Greek craftsmen that produced them adapted their wares to the tastes of that élite. As Gocha Tsetskhladze has written: 'the type of states and structures they had to deal with in the colonies were practically the same [as in Anatolia] - monarchies whose élites shared similar tastes'.[260] He also envisages the colonisation of this region as an essentially peaceful process that the Ionians used as a means to influence the local societies they encountered, particularly their leaders: 'Ionian behaviour in not opposing local kings [in the Odryssian Kingdom] ensured the survival of the Greeks and their way of life'.[261]

Warfare

Colonialist and Orientalist visions of ancient Miletos view it as either being so suppressed by Persian rule or so debauched and feminized by its exposure to Eastern wealth and culture that it had neither scope nor capacity for independent military action. However, a number of recent studies have shown that warfare was fundamental to Ionian identity.[262] Jan Paul Crielaard has observed that 'combined martial attitudes and a love of luxury' were a defining characteristic of the Ionian élite and formed a long established *habitus* within Ionian society, modelled on the Lydian example.[263]

[257] Graham 1964: 107-8. See also Gorman 2001 for the suggestion that they represent effort to repopulate Miletos after the Persian sack.
[258] We need not imagine, per Harris 1971: 205, that the Ionian fleet coerced the Propontic *poleis* into revolt. It just as plausible to suggest that the appearance of this force was a demonstration that their interests would be protected. Furthermore, the Persian focus on this area in 497 and 496, instead of the revolts Ionian heartland, and the ease in which they were able to reconquer it following the Ionian fleets move to Cyprus, further suggests the Hellespontines required their protection (Hdt. 5. 103, 116-7, 122).
[259] Archibald 1998.
[260] 2002, 90.
[261] Tsetskhladze 2002, 84
[262] i.e. Greaves 2010. 145-170; Crielaard 2013; Mac Sweeney 2013, 2015, 2017.
[263] Crielaard 2013.

Opportunities for warfare did exist for Milesians under Persian rule, for example between Samos and Miletos in C6 BCE where the Milesians may have been fighting as a proxy for Persia[264] or when Darius sent the Ionian fleet to subjugate of the Greek coastal cities as he marched overland to the Danube.[265] There also existed within Ionia culture a fierce culture of inter-state competition, which found physical manifestation in the construction of ever larger and larger temples and city walls[266] and even sometimes even raiding.[267] Individuals could also seek to accumulate wealth, valuable items for votive dedication, or personal *arête* through mercenary service.[268]

It is within this context that we can begin to understand Aristagoras' involvement in the unsuccessful Naxian expedition as being fully consistent with prevailing Milesian élite *habitus*. The Kyklades had long been an established arena for the Ionian elite display[269] and Aristagoras may well have had ambitions to lead the expedition and thereby gain prestige as conqueror of Naxos.[270] Aristagoras seems to have shouldered at least some of the cost[271] and Herodotus' suggestion that he wished to make himself ruler of Naxos[272] certainly seems to support the notion that he was motivated primarily by the opportunity to enhance his social and political capital and *arête*.[273] Here, Aristagoras was also able to use the institution of *xenia* for his own benefit because Herodotus claims that the Naxian exiles whose appeal occasioned the expedition were *xenia* of Histaiaos, and Aristagoras.[274] According to Simon Hornblower this appeal would have 'serious currency'.[275] Aristagoras, acting within the parameters of his élite Milesian *habitus*, was thus able to use the obligations of his kinsman Histaiaos to both appear to act as a good *xenos* and simultaneously enact his own ambitions.[276]

Following his failure against Naxos, Aristagoras' position as tyrant of Miletos may have become untenable, threatening the fundamental basis of his social status.[277] However, with the Ionian fleet stationed off Myous at his disposal he had the perfect tool at hand by which to gain *arête* through warfare.[278] His attack on Sardis and the sack of its temple was limited in its effect and possibly also its

[264] Carty 2016.
[265] Hdt. 4.89-97. Todd 1979, 5 notes that these were primarily Milesian colonies and Histiaios may have been conducting an imperialising mission of his own, though whether he had a hand in the destruction of Histria is debatable.
[266] Snodgrass 1986; Greaves 2010.
[267] Jackson 1995.
[268] Greaves 2010, 166-8; Crielaard 2013.
[269] Crielaard 2013.
[270] Austin 1990, 290 n.4; Hornblower 2013, 136. Aristagoras may have expected to lead the expedition prior to Artaphernes doubling the size of the requested fleet and placing it in the hands of Megabates - Harris 1971, 187.
[271] *Hdt*. 5.34-5.
[272] *Hdt.* 5.30
[273] Manville 1977, 83.
[274] *Hdt*. 5.30.
[275] Hornblower 2013, 131.
[276] The Karian-Greek Scylax of Myndos was another *xenoi* of the Milesian tyrant and it is possible to imagine that these connections were used, particularly given Aristagoras' defence of Scylax, as a way of drawing the Karian communities into the revolt. During the Persian campaign against Karia, Herodotus (5.120) specifically states that a Milesian force came up in support of the Karians after their defeat at the River Marysas. The importance of the Karians to Miletos is difficult to overstate, without their participation in the revolt the road to Miletos would be wide open for the Persians - Hornblower 2013, 304-5; Bresson 2019.
[277] Evans 1963, 119; Austin 1990: 290 n.4; Murray 1988: 473-4, Osborne 2009: 306.
[278] Wallinga 1984; Krentz 2010, 73.

initial intent.[279] From a teleological Colonialist and Orientalist viewpoint, this decisive action marked the point at which the Greeks rose up against Eastern oppression but it may not have been conceived of as such by Aristagoras.[280] Aideen Carty has suggested that Polykrates of Samos 'may well have seen a new opportunity to take Ionia from the Persians' just before his death in c. 522 BCE[281] and this idea that Persian interests in western Anatolia were fair game to ambitious Greek leaders may have inspired Aristagoras. However, and perhaps unbeknownst to Aristagoras, the Persians would inevitably take a very different view because they saw any act of sedition as a threat to the cosmogological balance of the very universe itself and, for the Persian court, Aristagoras' attack on Sardis could not be left unpunished.[282]

CONCLUSIONS

Herodotus attributes the cause of the so-called Ionian Revolt to the machinations of two members of the Milesian élite - Histaiaos and Aristagoras - but provides no reasons for why they acted in a way that was out of character with the previous half-century of Milesian-Persian relations.

Historians have posited a number of motivations for their actions, including political and economic reasons, but such scholarly justifications are themselves historically contextualised. It is perhaps understandable that Adelaide Glynne Dunham, writing in 1915, should view Persian control of Miletos through a colonialist lens, and see it as being as restrictive of local independence of action and wealth accumulation as that with which the British Empire, of which she was part, controlled its own territories. But, once established, this negative presumption of Milesian decline under Persia endured and even as recently as 2001 Vanessa Gorman was able to write: 'although at first Miletos fared well under Persian control … its days of growth and expansion were over'.[283] Such views can now be seen to be at odds with the recent discovery of multiple major temple-building projects and wealthy dedications and belie a thriving city that was home to a vibrant and highly competitive élite. Nested within such interpretations is often a binary concept of East-West interaction, inspired by Herodotus himself, that reflects Orientalist sentiments and sees freedom as the sole prerogative and goal of the Greeks in the West and diametrically opposed to 'enslavement' by Persian rule from the East.[284]

Adopting a post-colonial approach, [285] one of the authors (AG) has previously used a World Systems Analysis approach to position Miletos as a semi-periphery between the Persian core and the 'colonised' periphery that was the ultimate source of the raw materials and labour that Persia demanded.[286] However, giving primacy to the Milesians as actors in a global exchange process is, again, a consequence of our Herodotean source material,[287] the importance attached to the Greek

[279] Hdt 5.98.
[280] Neville 1979.
[281] Carty 2015: 210.
[282] Katchadourian 2016.
[283] Gorman 2001: 129.
[284] e.g. Scott 2005a, 46, quoted above.
[285] Feldman 2001.
[286] Greaves 2010, esp. pp. 137-143; 2019.
[287] Murray 1987.

polis by scholars,[288] and the inappropriate application of a modern capitalist consumption mentality to the ancient world.[289] In a more recent study that seeks to understand Persian imperialism in its own terms, Lori Katchadourian has argued that wealth did not in fact accrue to the core and that rather than being monetary, the transfer of capital was largely symbolic – perhaps even to the extent of including Histiaios and the Branchidai priesthood themselves as part of that transfer.

In this article, we have adopted a cognitive approach that attempts to understand individuals' decision-making within the context of their *habitus*. A generative interpretation of *habitus* views it not just as a series of social constraints on individuals' behaviour, but rather as potentially empowering opportunities that the individual embodies within their own person. Different social groups construct a *habitus* that is specific to them, based on their individual histories and relationships to those around them. The élite of Archaic Miletos, including Histiaios and Aristagoras, can be seen to have embodied a number of different long-established cultural practices of Greek or Lydian origin. Examples of enduring Greek *habitus* within the Milesian élite include *xenia* (guest-friendship), competition between wealthy families, and overseas 'colonisation'; whereas examples of Lydian *habitus* include their love of luxury and warfare. Persian rule introduced a new *habitus* but it did not replace these pre-existing Milesian practices and served only to add a new dimension of opportunity for enterprising members of the 'cosmopolitan' élite whose wealth allowed them to operate across wide regional contexts.[290]

A persistent habitus within Greek elite culture was the pursuit of *arête* (honour), which Linette Mitchell (2013) has observed could be achieved by three routes: sporting success in competitions, founding new cities, and war. Although there is scant evidence for Milesians competing in sporting games with other Greeks, or even with one another, there is ample evidence for them founding new cities through the emergent sixth century settlement paradigm of *oikist* and *apoikia* – i.e. so-called 'colonisation'. Whatever form it may have taken before the latter half of the C6th BCE, Milesian colonisation under the Persian Empire was a reciprocal process that established stable nodes for trade and security within contextually advantageous situations and also served as an outlet for ambitious individuals – catering for both Persian interests of those of the Milesian ruling élite; in short 'the Milesians and Persians were hand in glove.'[291] Milesians were already used to exercising agency through overseas settlement and trade whilst previously under the imperial aegis of Lydia and this established *habitus* remained compatible with Persian.

Does a changed awareness of Bourdieu's conception of *habitus* as a cognitive field of experience that is embodied within the individual and which facilitates their human agency, rather than delimiting it, make *habitus* a valuable interpretative perspective to bring to discussions of ancient history? The generative capacity of the *habitus* that Histiaios embodied is most clearly illustrated when he co-opted his Persian patronage to found Myrkinos and thereby achieve the Greek value of *arête.* Myrkinos played an pivotal role in the Herodotean account of events surrounding the Ionian Revolt and, when it is understood within the broader context of the *habitus* of Milesian colonisation, we can see that Histiaios was exercising the power that his new-found favour with the Persian king afforded

[288] Greaves 2010: 142-3.
[289] Dietler 2005; 2010.
[290] Crielaard 2013; Colburn 2017.
[291] Georges 2000, 15.

him to pursue *arête* in a manner that was entirely consistent with more long-established modes of behaviour within Milesian society – both Greek and Lydian.

The Milesian élite showed deference to Persia at the very highest levels: in their portrayal in the Persepolis reliefs, in Branchidai-Didyma's oracular pronouncements, and in their military support for the Scythian campaign. In return, they were permitted to channel Persian military and economic power, within reason and under close scrutiny. Histiaios' foundation of Myrkinos was one example but another, more troublesome, example is when Aristagoras attempted to take Naxos at the invitation of his *xenia* and with the military support of a Persian fleet. Again, military success was an established *habitus* in both the Greek and Lydian spheres and a long-established value of the Milesian élite. When the campaign failed, Aristagoras lost face and on his return he mobilised the military resources at his disposal to attack Sardis. Seeing it from the perspective of generative *habitus* allows us to see it as a functional behaviour with its own internal logic enacted within a context that structured how he could express his agency, re-consolidate his position after his failure at Naxos, and gain *arête*. Only with hindsight (and through an Orientalising lens) can we describe this action and the uprisings that it sparked elsewhere in the Persian Empire as a 'revolt'. This 'revolt' then took on a life of its own as a literary *topos* – becoming a paradigm for Greek-Persian relations not just in Herodotus' narrative but in many subsequent works.

To sum up, through the way in which the Milesian élite negotiated their *habitus* at the intersections of the cultural spheres of between Greece and Anatolia, between one *polis* and another, and even between one individual and another, we can see that they accommodated Persian rule within their pre-existing Anatolian (specifically Lydian)/Greek hybrid *habitus*, rather than assimilating a new culture wholesale from their Persian rulers. This is in part due to the nature of Persian rule, but also due to the multi-layered nature of *habitus* which is not imposed by the structure of empire, but rather accretes within the individual during their lifetime. As those individuals, especially members of the cosmopolitan élite, are exposed to different cultures and contexts they can find their capacity for individual agency 'liberated', rather than constrained, as Histiaios and Aristagoras evidently did.

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